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

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THE CONCEPT OF DREAD IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEIDEGGER

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1. Introduction

By way of introduction the question may be asked whether or not the description and analysis of psychic states, such as one of dread, give rise to any philosophical insight.[1] Is dread not simply an emotion? As such, is it not the object of psychological and possibly psychiatric examination? Can a philosophically founded judgment be made concerning dread—a judgment which is not based upon empirical, inductive, or possibly clinical methods?

If the question is formulated in this way, obviously the answer will have to be given in accordance with the form of the question. The point, however, is whether or not this way of putting the question does not show the predisposing influence of a desire to arrive at all costs at measurable and numerable results. As Plato shows in his *Meno*, man somehow anticipates the solution of a problem by his very attempt to solve it. One who asks reality psychological questions will receive psychological answers; one who proceeds as a biologist will arrive at biological insights; one who searches as a sociologist will propose sociological solutions, and so on. All these ways of asking questions are justified. But it is possible that there exists also a more fruitful and profound method of raising problems. Undoubtedly, it is possible to determine the specific weight of Milo's Venus and the aesthetic value of the planet Venus; yet the opposite problems will lead to more meaningful results. In an analogous

way, it is quite possible to consider dread as a psychical condition which happens to befall man, somewhat like a fit of coughing or a feeling of nausea. But it is more meaningful to ask oneself whether or not dread mirrors something of the essence of man, something which characterizes him just as much as thought, language, laughter, art, personal love, and so on. Since Søren Kierkegaard philosophy has repeatedly tried to arrive in this way at a more profound insight. In this respect special mention must be made of Martin Heidegger, Karl Jaspers, Gabriel Marcel, and Jean-Paul Sartre. Their way of considering the question has exercised an enormous influence, which has had notable effect upon broad circles of psychologists, psychiatrists, and physicians. This success does not prove that the solutions of these philosophers are acceptable without any qualification. However, we would like to quote the old saying, *Ab esse valet illatio ad posse.* From the actual existence of a philosophical method one may draw a valid conclusion regarding its possibility. To anyone who is not prejudiced it is manifest that dread, personal love, hope, and the like, are human modes of existence which are not purely fortuitous, and that for this reason they are capable of serving as starting points for speculations of anthropological philosophy.

I should like to illustrate this point by means of one great philosopher—Martin Heidegger. Obviously, it will not be possible to take into account the whole evolution of Heidegger as a man and a philosopher, all the greatly divergent phases of his philosophical research, its different interpretations, and Heidegger's own self-interpretation. I will limit myself to a single question—namely, What is the meaning of dread in the philosophical consideration of man, as it is given in Heidegger's main work, *Being and Time* (*Sein und Zeit* [1926])? Only in a complementary way will reference be made to his minor works of the same period, *What Is Metaphysics?* (*Was ist Metaphysik?*),[2] *The Essence of Ground* (*Vom Wesen des Grundes*),[3] and

[1]This paper was read at the Harvard Philosophical Club on April 26, 1956.

[2]The first edition was published in 1929; the fifth, at Frankfurt am Main, in 1949. Hereafter the work will be referred to as *Met.*

[3]The first edition was published in 1929; the third, at Frankfurt am Main, in 1949. Hereafter the work will be referred to as *Grund.*

[4]The first edition was published in 1929; the second, at Frankfurt am Main, in 1950. Hereafter the work will be referred to as *Kant.*

[5]"Die Welt ist gleichsam schon weiter draussen als es je ein Objekt sein kann" (*Sein und Zeit*, p. 366). Hereafter this work will be referred to as *S.u.Z.*

Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (*Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*).[4] Later works will not be considered if only because in them Heidegger does not return to the phenomenon of dread.

2. Dread in Heidegger's Philosophy

The World

Accordingly, I will try to discover how Heidegger sees the problem in his so-called second phase, which probably is the most important period of his philosophical life.

For Heidegger, man is essentially a "being-in-the-world." This may sound quite simple, but usually it is misunderstood. It does not at all mean that man is located in a physical world. When Heidegger speaks of "world," he does not mean by it the material cosmos, the universe of beings, or the totality of all actual and possible intentional objects. Likewise, *worldly* or *mundane* is not the opposite of *transcendent*, *supernatural*, or *divine*. What he means by *world* is perhaps best explained by means of his concept of *concern*. According to Heidegger, our relation to all that is, is not primarily that of knowing, loving, and tending, but that of being concerned in its various senses. What we are concerned with does not have the character of a *thing* in the Kantian sense. It is something which we handle, with which we are related in this way or that, which we must use. What is does not appear to us primarily as a *res* but as a *utensil*; our relation with it is that of concern understood in the various senses of the German word *Sorge*, such as "taking to heart," "minding," "worrying," "taking precautions," and "taking care of." From this point of view reality is not a disordered pile of objects but reveals itself in a certain structure—one utensil refers to another, and all utensils together form for us a network of possible ways of acting or, as Heidegger expresses it, a "universe of utensils" (*Zeugganzes*). Of course, this pragmatic whole is limited. There is an ultimate boundary beyond which all series of goals and means become lost in the vague, the opaque, the unknown. "The world is, as it were, already further outside than any object can ever be," Heidegger remarks.[5]

Clearly, Heidegger refers here to Husserl's concept of "horizon." For Husserl, "horizon" has two meanings. His "external horizon" (*Außenhorizont*) is concerned with spatial relationships. For instance, I am conscious that this table stands in a room, the room is in a house, the house in a street, a city, and so on. Of Pennsylvania, the United States, the earth, the system of planets, I have only a vague idea. My thinking becomes proportionally poorer in content-determinations as the concentric circles increase in size. However, there is one thing of which I am certain—even the system of planets, the stars, and so forth, are somewhere. This "somewhere" constitutes a spatial horizon. Whatever belongs to the mode of being of a thing is bounded a priori by this horizon. In an analogous way, everything is related to the temporal "inner horizon" (*Innenhorizont*). For instance, I am able to anticipate my future, and I also do anticipate it all the time and of necessity. I think, for example, that I know what will happen to me in an hour, a day, or a week. Of events which will take place one, five, or ten years hence I have only an idea which is extremely poor in content. Finally a stage is reached of which I know nothing else than that even in the distant future something will happen. This certainty that even in the most distant moment something will happen constitutes the temporal horizon which usually I call "the future."

This conception is transposed by Heidegger to the pragmatic structure of environment (*Umwelt*). One utensil refers to another. The nail makes me think of the beam, the beam of the roof, the roof of the house. All this constitutes a definite connected whole. Even if I were to come across a utensil which I did not recognize or understand, I will always be able somehow to place it in a greater connected whole. I know at least this much, that it is good for something; it has a bearing upon this or that; in German, it has necessarily its *Bewandtnis* with this or that thing. This *Bewandtnis* or interconnection of all kinds of utensils again constitutes a kind of horizon. It is reassuring that, thanks to our "being-concerned-with," all things are mutually ordered, that one thing refers to another, that all belong to a great horizon of usefulness and utility. And therefore I am at

[6]"In-sein bedeuted wohnen bei . . . vertraut sein mit" (*ibid.*, p. 54).

peace with them. As we express it, "We will let things be" (*Wir lassen es dabei bewenden*).

It is to be noted that when Heidegger speaks here of a horizon, he does not think of the abstract mathematical concept of a *limes* or of a concept of limit in the Kantian sense, but of a concrete horizon. This concrete horizon can be characterized in many different and apparently contradictory ways. Take, for instance, the horizon of a landscape. This horizon certainly is *not* the landscape itself. On the contrary, the landscape is limited and rendered finite by it. With respect to the landscape the horizon is nothingness. Yet it is something insofar as it has a definite function. The horizon explains not only the finiteness of the landscape but also gives it shape, design, and relief. Thanks to the horizon the landscape as a whole is visible, demonstrable (*offenbar*). Details are discernible in it for us, and they make meaningful behavior possible for us. Nevertheless, the horizon is not an object like other objects; it does not form part of the landscape; it does not exist before the landscape or alongside it. It is a "nothing-of-landscape," yet it is something—namely, that which makes the landscape possible. These judgments are only apparently contradictory. The apparent contradictions correspond with the ambiguity and ambivalence of the concept of horizon. Later we shall have to revert to this problem, although in a wholly different context.

Dasein

No matter how we conceive these various horizons, whether according to Husserl or according to Heidegger, they form the sphere of the trusted, the well-known, and the understandable. Whatever we encounter, be it as puzzling as it may, is in one respect immediately understandable—prior to every experience regarding the unknown reality, we understand it as belonging to the great existential horizon. We conceive it as located in the world. Note that this *in* has no spatial meaning, but rather characterizes the sphere of prepredicative acquaintance of all "worldly" beings and their mutual relationships. "Being-in," says Heidegger, "means to dwell by . . . to be at home with."[6] However, our own existence is not comparable with the being of things as given in nature (*das Vorhandene*) or with the being of utensils (*das Zuhandene*). It would rather be correct to say that

in being we are passionately interested in our being. Such a being Heidegger calls *Dasein*. *Dasein* is being which is interested in its being for its very being;[7] "*Dasein* is that kind of being whose task it is to be . . .";[8] or, to use the language of the French existentialists, "*Il a à être.*"

Mood

Generally speaking, we are not aware of this task. Through our reasoning intellect we are able to determine, order, and systematize things within the horizon of the world; thus reason hides and conceals the most fundamental truths. But there is a possibility of an unveiling (*Erschließungsmöglichkeit*), which is more original than reason; namely, mood (*Gestimmtsein*). This phenomenon, which apparently is most trivial and ordinary, reveals to us precisely the oppressive nature of our existence, its characteristic of being-a-task-to-be-done. In the mood of anxiety, displeasure, and even boredom the fact that we have to be makes its entrance and appears as an oppressive burden. But lighthearted moods also prove the same, inasmuch as they take the burden of existence from our shoulders, if only for a short time. In the most common everyday mood we experience our "thrownness" (*Geworfenheit*). We suddenly know that we have to be and for our being have to depend upon the world. "Precisely in the most indifferent and inoffensive everydayness the being of *Dasein* can burst open into a naked 'that it is and has to be.' "[9] In other words, through the mood and in the mood it is revealed to us that we find ourselves in a world without having previously known, chosen, loved, or willed it. For this reason Heidegger calls that to which we pre-philosophically give the name of mood, in his philosophical language, *Befindlichkeit*; that is, the way in which man finds himself "thrown" into the world.

Fear gives rise to a different question. Fear does not reveal the horizons of our existence but something within these horizons, something which threatens, whose approach we feel, and whose dangerous nature we understand. Something which comes from a definite direction and threatens is what constitutes the object of fear *par excellence.*

[7] "Das Dasein ist Seiendes, dem es in seinem Sein um dieses selbst geht" (*ibid.*, p. 191).

[8] "Es ist seinem eigenen zu-sein überantwortet" (*ibid.*, p. 42).

[9] ". . . gerade in der gleichgültigsten und harmlosesten Alltäglichkeit kann das Sein des Dasein als nacktes 'Dass es ist und zu sein hat' aufbrechen" (*ibid.*, p. 134).

(Probably you understand that Heidegger argues here against what he considers the undifferentiated rationalization of Scholastic philosophy—the *malum futurum* as the object of *timor* is not the same as the threat which comes closer and closer from a definite direction.) Only the *Dasein* is capable of experiencing fear in this sense, for only the *Dasein* is passionately interested in its own existence. It feels itself threatened in its most proper concern, its existence. "Only being which in its being is interested in its very being can fear." At any rate, that which we fear is something definite within the horizon of the world. Thus we have the essential possibility of fleeing from it. We turn away from it not only externally but especially internally. We do not want to think of the threat; therefore we take refuge in the security of amorphous society and public opinion (*das Man*). We do just like the others. We give up being ourselves, realizing our own possibilities, living our own lives. In the society of the impersonal *das Man* we forget our liberty, our own tasks; we forget them together with the dangers which threaten especially ourselves. The *Dasein* allows itself to be leveled down to the average (*Einebung*). Thus the *Dasein* falls away into unauthentic being. It is not genuine, not itself, and becomes unfaithful to its own vocation.

Dread

Nevertheless, the foregoing survey is not the last word of Heidegger's philosophy. The question which every man can and must raise is, Why do I fear? On the level of reason we cannot point to any cause for fear. On a purely rational level it is possible to enumerate all the reasons for fear, arrange them systematically, and determine our attitude towards them. Pain, sorrow, sickness, even our own death, have a definite place in our rational system. The Stoics, for instance, typically praised such a rationalization. We know, or at least we think we know, that after death we shall continue to live in the cosmos, or in the triumphant proletariat, or that our soul will continue to exist while the body is dissolved, and so on. Nevertheless, we fear the threatening approach of danger. There must be a ground for this. Note that we say "ground" and not "cause." There must be something which is the foundation for all kinds of fear. This foundation is dread (*Angst*).

What is the difference between fear and dread? Dread is not

directed towards this thing or that; it does not have as its object any thing, object, or person. It is not an intentional emotion. In his peculiar language Heidegger gives expression to something which many other thinkers have independently observed. "The 'what' of dread is not something existing *in* our world." [10] This means, first of all, that one can dread without observing anything threatening. It means further that in the lived experience of dread all things become unimportant, meaningless, and irrelevant. Not only things themselves but also their purposive and pragmatic connections, their *Bewandtnis*, seem to lose their meaning. "The whole of interconnections, discovered *in* the world, between the things of nature (*das Vorhandene*) and utensils (*das Zuhandene*) is, as such, wholly unimportant. It lapses into nothingness." [11] Briefly, in the lived experience of dread, it is the very foundation itself which crumbles, the foundation upon which our whole life is based. For this reason Kierkegaard himself had said, "Dread may be compared with dizziness." [12] It is not this or that but everything, or rather the whole connection of everything, the very world itself, which suddenly seems to become oppressive, threatening, *unheimlich*. In other words, the world is no longer the trusted dwelling, whose every piece of furniture is dear to us and in which it is useful, safe, and meaningful to live. On the contrary, everything enclosed in our universal horizon suddenly appears strange, awful, puzzling, and devoid of meaning. And our own dealing with the things of the world, our handling of utensils, our life which ran its course along the lines laid down by the amorphous anonymity of *das Man*, seems to have become problematic, trivial, and useless.

[10] "Das Wovor der Angst ist kein innerweltlich Seiendes" (*ibid.*, p. 186).

[11] "Die innenweltlich entdeckte Bewandtnisganzheit des Zuhandenen und Vorhandenen ist als solche überhaupt ohne Belang. Sie sinkt in sich zusammen" (*ibid.*, p. 186).

[12] *Angst* (Dutch translation of S. van Praag, p. 76).

[13] "Im Wovor der Angst wird das 'Nichts ist es und Nirgends' offenbar. Die Aufsässigkeit des innerweltlichen Nichts und Nirgends besagt phänomenal: das Wovor der Angst ist die Welt als solche. Die völlige Unbedeutsamkeit, die sich im Nichts und Nirgends bekundet, bedeutet nicht Weltabwesenheit, sondern besagt, dass das innerweltlich Seiende an ihm selbst so völlig belanglos ist, dass auf dem Grunde dieser Unbedeutsamkeit des Innenweltlichen die Welt in ihrer Weltlichkeit sich einzig noch aufdrängt" (*S. u. Z.*, pp. 186-87).

[14] "Wovor die Angst sich ängstet, ist das In-der-Welt-sein selbst" (*ibid.*, p. 187).

[15] "In der Angst versinkt das unweltlich Zuhandene, überhaupt das innerlich Seiende. Die 'Welt' vermag nichts mehr zu bieten, ebensowenig das Mitdasein Anderer. Die Angst benimmt so dem Dasein die Möglichkeit verfallend sich aus der 'Welt' in der öffentlichen Angelegenheit zu verstehen. Sie wirft das Dasein auf das zurück, worum es sich ängstet, sein eigentliches In-der-Welt-sein-können" (*ibid.*, p. 187).

[16] *Met.*, p. 189.

Thus it should be clear that dread plays a very important role in the philosophy of Heidegger. However, this fact should not be misinterpreted. In Heidegger, there is no question of a philosophy of despair. But only in dread does the phenomenon of the world reveal itself clearly—negatively, because it becomes manifest that the world is neither this nor that, neither here nor there and that with respect to beings-in-the-world the world itself is nothing and nowhere; positively, because our being-concerned-with-the-world, our being-dependent-upon-the-world, briefly our "worldliness," reveals itself unmistakably. As Heidegger literally says, "The 'what' of dread reveals itself as 'it is nothing and nowhere.' The trivial character of the beings-*in*-the-world signifies phenomenonally: that which dread dreads is the world as such. The utter unimportance which reveals itself in nothing and nowhere does not mean being away from the world but expresses that the beings-*in*-the-world are so wholly insignificant that, because of this unimportance of the beings-*in*-the-world, the world itself in its worldliness alone forces itself upon us." [13] And a little later: "That for which dread is in dread is precisely the very being-in-the-world." [14] Thus dread has a purifying and cleansing action. The flight into the one-like-many-ness of *das Man*, into the apparent safety of being among others with the average as the moral norm, appears meaningless and useless. Man is thrown back upon himself, upon his own genuine possibilities, upon that which really constitutes his existence. "In dread the utensils of our environment, as well as what is in-the-world, disappear. The 'world' as well as the *Dasein*-together-with-others no longer have anything to offer. In this way dread deprives the *Dasein* of the possibility to understand itself by 'falling away' from the world into public affairs. It throws the *Dasein* back upon that for which it is in dread—namely, its own potentiality of being-in-the-world." [15] "Being-in-the-world changes into the existential mode of not-being-at-home," Heidegger states.[16] But this *Un-heimlichkeit*, this not-being-at-home, this *unzuhause* is precisely what is experienced in living through dread. True, this experience may be occasioned sometimes by physiological causes. But this fact does not say anything regarding its nature. As Heidegger correctly remarks, "The physiological release of dread [becomes] pos-

sible only because the *Dasein* dreads in the very foundation of its being." [17]

The World and Nothingness

In the preceding exposé we have followed the arguments of *Being and Time* in a simplified but faithful way without entering into many details. If we consult the other works of Heidegger dating from the same period, we are confronted with apparently deviating formulas. So we are obliged to make interpretations. In *What Is Metaphysics?* there is no question at all of "world" and "worldliness." To our surprise, Heidegger says here that in the experience of dread nothingness comes to the foreground. To be more accurate, precisely because in the experience of dread, what-is escapes us in its totality, and the triviality of these beings comes to the foreground. When we dread, we reject what-is in its triviality, as well as its universal interconnections. But the fact that we are able to do so shows that we are capable of transcending what-is. We may even say that this power to rise above what-is constitutes precisely the essence of *Dasein*. For *Dasein* means to be free, to be able to determine one's attitude towards this or that and especially toward one's own being. But *Dasein* would not be able to do this if it did not possess an original contact with that which, in respect of what-is, is radically other; and this is nothingness. The very fact that *Dasein*, in living through dread, is capable of rejecting what-is in its universal interconnection reveals its original relationship to nothingness. Nothingness does not annihilate what-is, for then what-is would no longer exist in its dread-provoking appearance; it does not deny what-is, for negation is a function of reason; but it attacks what-is in its existential value,

[17]"Die physiologische Auslösung von Angst . . . [wird] nur möglich weil das Dasein im Grunde seines Seins sich ängstet" (*S. u. Z.*, p. 190).

[18]"Dasein heisst: Hinausgehaltenheit in das Nichts. Sichhineinhaltend in das Nichts ist das Dasein je schon über das Seiende im Ganzen hinaus. Dieses Hinaussein über das Seiende nennen wir die Transzendenz. Würde das Dasein im Grunde seines Wesens nicht transzendieren d.h. jetzt, würde es sich nicht von vorüberein in das Nichts hineinhalten, dann könnte es sich nie zu Seienden verhalten, also auch nicht zu sich selbst" (*Met.*, p. 32).

[19]"Ohne ursprüngliche Offenbarkeit des Nichts kein Selbstsein und keine Freiheit" (*ibid.*).

[20]"Dass das Bedrohende nirgends ist, characterisiert das Wovor der Angst." And, "Im Wovor der Angst wird das 'Nichts ist es und nirgends' offenbar" (*S. u. Z.*, p. 186).

[21]"Die völlige Unbedeutsamkeit, die sich im Nichts und Nirgends bekundet, bedeutet nicht Weltabwesenheit, sondern besagt, dass auf dem Grund dieser Unbedeutsamkeit des Innerweltlichen die Welt in ihrer Weltlichkeit sich einzig noch aufdrängt" (*ibid.*, p. 187).

its meaningfulness, its relevancy. Nothingness does not annihilate but "naughtens" or "nihilates." This is important with respect to liberty. For a free decision with respect to this or that is possible only because this or that is understood as trivial. As Heidegger himself expresses it, *Dasein* means "being-projected-into-nothingness. Projecting itself into nothingness *Dasein* is already beyond what-is in its totality. This being beyond what-is we call transcendence. Were *Dasein* not in its essential basis transcendent—that is to say, not projected from the very start into nothingness—it could never be related to what-is and therefore could have no relationship to itself." [18] But this would be contrary to the essence of the *Dasein*. Therefore, Heidegger concludes, "Without the original revelation of nothingness there is no self-being and no freedom." [19]

Thus we see that in *What Is Metaphysics?* another voice is heard than in *Being and Time*. Although the voice is different, however, the intelligent listener will discover that the theme is the same, provided that no exaggerated importance is attached to a certain terminology. With respect to being-in-the-world, the source from which dread derives its essential possibility and intelligibility is that which is radically the other. In *Being and Time*, also, Heidegger claims, "Nothing of what is in the world as 'given by nature' or as 'utensils' characterizes the 'what' of dread; the 'what' of dread reveals itself as 'it is nothing and nowhere.'" [20]

This radically other, of which the *Dasein* knows already and which enables it to transcend what-is in its universal interconnection, is called "the world" in *Being and Time*. The world is here that which reveals the triviality of what-is. It is the world which "nihilates." As we have seen before, "the utter unimportance which reveals itself in nothing and nowhere does not mean being-away-from-the-world but expresses that, because of this unimportance of what-is-in-the-world, the world in its worldliness alone forces itself upon us." [21] It is a fact that in many Indo-Germanic languages *angst* is connected with *eng*, a root meaning "narrow," which is preserved, for example, in the Latin *angustiae*. Hence Heidegger says: "What causes dread (*beengt*) is not 'this' or 'that' nor the sum total of all that is given in nature, but the general possibility of 'utensils,' that is, the world itself. When dread subsides, everyday speech usually

says: 'It was not really anything' . . ." But "the nothing-of-utensils is based upon the most original 'something,' the world."[22] It is only because of our possibility as human beings to rise above all connections of finality and rationality and thus to establish a total horizon that the various existing beings become intelligible. The intelligibility and obviousness of beings in the world, their demonstrability—in Heidegger's terminology, their *Offenbarheit*—can be thought only upon the basis of the totally other and the more original something.[23] This something Heidegger calls nothingness. Therefore he says here: "Nothingness is neither an object nor a being at all. Nothingness occurs neither by itself nor 'apart from' what-is as a sort of adjunct. Nothingness is that which makes the revelation of what-is as such possible to our human *Dasein*." And in his work *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, exactly the same affirmation is made: "Dread is that fundamental way of 'being-placed' (*Befindlichkeit*) which confronts one with nothingness. But the being of what-is is not at all intelligible—and herein lies the ultimate finiteness of transcendence—if *Dasein* is not in the very foundation of its essence projected into nothingness. This being projected into nothingness is not just any thinking of nothingness, which sometimes may be attempted, but an event which lies at the basis of every being situated

[22]"Was beengt, ist nicht dieses oder jenes, aber auch nicht alles Vorhandene zusammen als Summe, sondern die Möglichkeit von Zuhandenem überhaupt, d.h. die Welt selbst. Wenn die Angst sich gelegt hat dann pflegt die alltägliche Rede zu sagen: es war eigentlich nichts . . ." "Das Nichts von Zuhandenheit gründet im ursprünglichsten 'Etwas' in der Welt" (*ibid.*).

[23]*Ibid.*

[24]"Die Angst ist diejenige Grundbefindlichkeit, die vor das Nichts stellt. Das Sein des Seienden ist aber überhaupt nur verstehbar — und darin liegt die tiefste Endlichkeit der Transzendenz — wenn das Dasein im Grunde seines Wesens sich in das Nichts hineinhält. Dieses Sichhineinhalten in das Nichts ist kein beliebiges und zuweilen versuchtes 'Denken' des Nichts, sondern ein Geschehen, das allem Sichbefinden inmitten des schon Seiendes zugrundeliegt" (*Kant*, pp. 214 f.).

[25]"Sich hinhaltend in das Nichts, ist das Dasein ja schon über das Seiende hinaus. Dieses Hinaussein über das Seiende nennen wir Transzendenz" (*Met.*, p. 32).

[26]*Grund*, p. 17.

[27]*Ibid.*, p. 18.

[28]"Wir nennen das, woraufhin das Dasein als solches transzendiert, die Welt, und bestimmen jetzt die Transzendenz als In-der-Welt-sein" (*ibid.*, p. 19).

[29]"Das Dasein transzendiert, heisst: es ist im Wesen seines Seins weltbildend" (*ibid.*, p. 36).

[30]"Transzendenz heisst Weltentwurf, so zwar dass das Entwerfende von Seienden, das es übersteigt, auch schongestimmt durchwaltet ist" (*ibid.*, p. 42).

[31]Cf. *Kant*, pp. 196 and 124.

[32]"Das ekstatische Wesen des Menschen beruht in der Ek-sistenz" (p. 15).

in the midst of what-already-is."[24] Briefly, nothingness is the horizon of the existent. The existence of beings in the world is their being embedded in this total horizon. In this sense nothingness has philosophically the same function in *What Is Metaphysics?* as the world has in *Being and Time.*

The correctness of this interpretation appears also from the concept of transcendence. As we have seen before, in *What Is Metaphysics?* Heidegger says: "Projected into nothingness, the *Dasein* is already beyond what-is. This 'being beyond' what-is we call transcendence."[25] In his work *The Essence of Ground*, which, as Heidegger himself emphasizes, originated at the same time as *What Is Metaphysics?* (1928), he calls attention to the fact that to transcend means to proceed beyond, to climb over, to rise above.[26] But that beyond which one proceeds is "precisely and solely what-is itself."[27] Such a proceeding-beyond is possible only in function of the world. "We call that, which *Dasein* as such transcends, the world and now determine transcendence as being-in-the-world."[28] "The '*Dasein* transcends' means that in the essence of its being it is formative of the world."[29] *Dasein* forms the world; it makes a project of the world; it does not create the world from nothing but forms it on the basis of its being-together-with-other-beings and having concern with them. In making a "project" of the world, being-placed-there, which pre-ontologically is mood, is a determining factor. Thus it can be explained that, for instance, the world of dread is so profoundly different from the world of the impersonal *das Man.* "Transcendence means 'project' of the world in such a way that the projecting subject is nonetheless tuned to and ruled by that which he transcends."[30] And because transcending is nothing but the making of a horizon which covers what-is in its totality and thus renders it intelligible, Heidegger's transcendence is essentially finite.[31] True, in *Being and Time* the concept of transcendence does not yet play a role; but, once again, we must not be taken in by a purely termonological change of scenery. What in some works is called "to transcend" lies contained, implicitly at least, in the term "to exist," which Heidegger for clarity's sake spells as "to ex-sist" (for example, in his *Letter Concerning Humanism*, "the ecstatic nature of man lies in his ex-sistence").[32] For this reason he states in *Being and Time*, as well

as in *The Essence of Ground*, "In being-placed-there lies existentially an unveiling being-dependent-on-the-world." [33]

From the quoted text we conclude that for Heidegger "world" and "nothingness" mean the same—namely, the total horizon which extends to all that is, which is essentially different from the sum total of all that is and even in a sense the negation of the "common being of all things." Precisely because of its being totally different, it renders the various "worldly" beings knowable, usable, and intelligible. The essential difference between world and what-is-in-the-world comes to the foreground in all clarity in the experience of dread. In dread all that is loses the firmness of its lines; its interconnection becomes opaque and meaningless; but the world and our dependence on it remain. In this lies the relevant importance of dread for fundamental ontology.

3. The Foundation of Dread

A Deficiency in Heidegger's Thought

In the preceding pages we have indicated the exact place which the phenomenon of dread occupies in the philosophical thought of Heidegger. It has become clear that his descriptions possess great value. The way in which he poses the problem is majestic, daring, and original. He offers a philosophical hermeneutics of many important aspects of human existence. In one point, however, I think he fails to supply the answer. And this point is a philosophical question *par excellence*. Briefly and simply it is the question, Why is the *Dasein* in dread? What is the foundation of its being-in-dread? This question is concerned with the foundation of dread and not with its cause. The cause of dread is known; it may be, for instance, heart

[33]"In der Befindlichkeit liegt existenzial eine erschliessende Angewiesenheit auf Welt (*S. u. Z.*, p. 137 f.).

[34]*Ibid.*, p. 187.

[35]"Zur Selbstheit gehört Welt; diese ist wesenhaft daseinsbezogen" (*Grund*, p. 35).

[36]"Das Dasein transzendiert, heisst: es ist im Wesen seines Seins weltbildend" (*ibid.*, p.36).

[37]"Aller Entwurf — und demzufolge auch alles 'schöpferische' Handeln — ist geworfen d.h. durch ihrer selbst nicht mächtige Angewiesenheit des Daseins auf das schon Seiende im Ganzen bestimmt" (*Kant*, p. 212).

[38]The correctness of this interpretation is clear also from the work of Heidegger's disciple Walter Biemel, who writes: "Saying that the world is function of the *Dasein* is saying that it contains the whole of the relations which the *Dasein* must necessarily unfold to be able to exist" (*Le concept du monde chez Heidegger* [Paris-Louvain, 1950], p. 161).

[39]*S. u. Z.*, p. 144.

trouble, respiratory difficulties, schizophrenia, and so on. But what is its foundation? In this respect Heidegger does not offer a solution. True, he says that what a man in dread dreads is the world as such.[34] But precisely within the framework of Heidegger's philosophy this answer is particularly unsatisfactory. For the world is the total horizon of all real and possible references. This horizon arises through the meaningful, purposive activity of man himself. As Heidegger would put it, the consciousness of the ego "puts the world there." The world is essentially a world of consciousness and a world for the sake of consciousness. Differently, but in a sense even more emphatically, Heidegger expresses his thought by saying, "To self-being belongs the world; this world is essentially relative to *Dasein*";[35] and "'The *Dasein* transcends' means that in the essence of its being it is *formative of the world*."[36] So the world corresponds with an original "project" of the *Dasein*. The *Dasein* forms its world; and this world exists in its totality through and for the sake of the *Dasein*. Note that man does not create a world; he does not produce it. Heidegger's position is far removed from any form of idealism. He explicitly states: "Every 'project' and therefore also every 'creative' activity is 'thrown,' that is, determined by the dependence of the *Dasein*, which itself is impotent, upon what-already-is in its totality."[37] The *Dasein* does not create its world, but "projects" and "forms" it. In projecting and forming a world it depends upon other beings. It is in this that lies its "thrownness" (*Geworfenheit*). Man does not build his house from nothing but with building materials that he can handle.[38] Nonetheless, the house is his own construction. Nothing is known as well and as familiar to man as that which he has made himself. Nothing causes less dread. Whence, then, comes this sudden feeling of not-being-at-home, this *Unheimlichkeit*, this impression of strangeness? How does it happen that the horizon which we ourselves "project" all the time[39] suddenly becomes too narrow and straitens us? Briefly, dread, as described by Heidegger, is a *deus ex machina*. It appears as a wicked fairy who, with her magic wand, changes everything into its opposite. How? Why? On what occasion? All this remains obscure.

Nevertheless, we think that Heidegger correctly observes that "that for which dread is in dread is precisely the very being-in-the-world." What he says here is a fact which has been confirmed by many men of science both empirical and philosophical. It is no coincidence that the technical term used by psychiatrists for certain states of dread is "the experience of the 'foundering' of the world" (*Weltuntergang-erlebnis*). We should prefer, however, to give a different philosophical interpretation to this fact. If a man in dread experiences the world as inhospitable, strange, and dismal, the reason lies perhaps in the fact that he has never been really at home in the world. The feeling that everything forms part of one great interconnected whole, that great lines of rationality and finality order and dominate the whole, and that we can "leave it at that"—this feeling perhaps is nothing but a flight, an excuse, a drawing-away from the truth, a sliding down into the unauthentic, the evasive, the ambiguous. It may be true that the world, considered phenomenologically, corresponds with a "project" of the *Dasein*. The world of the biologist is different from that of an artist; the world of a statesman is not that of a man of science. If everyone who feels himself secure and safe in his world is not disturbed when he is confronted with an unsolved problem—because knowing of the existence of a great all-embracing order he is able to assign a place to this problem as a problem—this can be explained by the fact that it is he himself who has constructed this order. In this sense the world is really a home which the *Dasein* has built and continues to build for itself. But at a certain moment this home appears to be a house of cards. The whole structure becomes problematic; its system of co-ordination no longer seems to clarify anything; there is no longer any protection within its confines; and its furniture is no longer purposive. When this happens, man sees himself confronted with the totally other, with something that does not fit into his picture of the world, something which in the various languages of different races has been indicated, though not described, as the *mysterium tremens et fascinans*, the awe-inspiring and fascinating mystery.[40] This peculiar awe-inspiring and fascinating char-

[40]Cf. Rudolf Otto, *Das Heilige. Ueber das Irrationale in der Idee des Göttlichen und sein Verhältnis zum Rationalen* (16 ed.; Gotha, 1927).
[41]*Angst*, p. 51.
[42]*Ibid.*, p. 52.

acter of dread has been likewise neglected by Heidegger. Dread is what in the technical language of the psychiatrist and the psychologist is known as an ambivalent experience. It attracts and terrifies; it elevates and crushes; it fascinates and makes one shudder. Kierkegaard proceeds in a much more phenomenological way when he writes, "Dread is a sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic sympathy . . . Language confirms this fully, for one may speak of a 'sweet' feeling of dread, or a bashful dread." [41] Kierkegaard points to the experience of dread in children, their "search for the adventurous, the colossal, the enigmatic." [42] A German child psychologist speaks in this connection of *Wonneangst*, delightful dread. One can think here also of the spectacle offered by a catastrophe of nature—it crushes, yet at the same time it elevates. It crushes by "nihilating" the houses of cards that are our worlds; it elevates by revealing the totally other which has no place and cannot have a place in these houses of cards. But if it is true that in the experience of dread the world in its totality is shaken and not only the beings-in-the-world, not only the "things of nature" and the "utensils," but also their very foundation, then we have a proof here that the finite horizon of the world is not the ultimate horizon of our existence. Moreover, we have a world view, a consciousness of the world; we have a concept of the world. Heidegger makes constant use of this concept and appears to utilize it to mark the boundaries which divide the world from something else which is non-world. It may be admitted that the world is a horizon of finite beings and that this world corresponds with a "project" of the *Dasein*. But whoever thinks of a boundary while thinking, transcends the boundary. And it is precisely that which lies beyond the boundary which inspires dread. It is true that the sudden realization of the presence of the totally other "nihilates" and shows the uselessness, the narrowness, and the limitation of all our horizons. But this proves that another transcendence is possible than that of a "project" of the world. So to transcend means in the first place and in the proper sense to transcend the limits of the "worldly" and to pass from finite to infinite Being.

The Totally Other

Heidegger himself saw this difficulty; otherwise he would not be the great thinker he is. On the last page of *Kant and the Essence of*

Metaphysics he puts himself this question, "Is it possible to develop even as a problem the finiteness in *Dasein* without presupposing 'infinity'? What is the nature of this 'presupposing' in the *Dasein*? What is the meaning of the infinity which is 'posited' in this way?" [43] The intelligent reader will remark that Heidegger does not merely raise here an antinomy but also gives its solution. He argues as follows. How can the *Dasein* presuppose the being of the infinite, except as *Dasein*? And how can the *Dasein* posit such a thing except within the framework of its finite world? Is then the finiteness not the original, and the infinite its derivative? [44] However, against this way of presenting the matter we could raise objections precisely from a phenomenological point of view. For the infinite Being is not presupposed in the usual sense of the term, as, for instance, a chess player presupposes that his knight is in this square or a mathematician presupposes that a figure revolves round its diagonal. If man posited infinite Being, it would be true that this Being is *ipso facto* included in a finite worldly horizon. But he does not posit it; he runs into it. It forces itself upon him in spite of himself. It is the strangest, the most awful, the most terrifying thing that can be experienced. It does not fit into any picture of the world. It is totally other. It is the nothingness of the world of *Dasein*. It "nihilates" the world picture. The experience of this nihilation may assume different forms; for instance, that of bliss or that of dread. But even this dread elevates. It makes man free. It places him squarely in front of the mystery. It consumes everything which is not authentic. It liberates the *Dasein* so that it can pursue its own potentialities and specifically the possibility of transcending the horizons of finite being.

However, all this does not dispose of the objection which we ourselves have raised above. Dread still remains for us a *deus ex machina*. No answer has been given yet to the question how such a thing is possible. How are we to conceive such an irruption (*Einbruch*) of the Infinite into the finite? Why does man experience dread? How can such a thing be conceived?

The answer can only be that what appears to us an irruption is not really an irruption. The opposite is true. From the very beginning the *Dasein* is confronted with infinite Being. But it does not know this at once. A certain process of maturation is necessary to

[43] *Kant*, p. 202.

[44] *S. u. Z.*, p. 423.

experience it explicitly. Man has to construct a world in order to be able to experience that there exists something beyond the world. He must first project a horizon before he can become aware of the narrowness of this horizon. But that which in the course of development is last in making its appearance, may nonetheless be the foundation of the whole development. *Finis est in intentione.* The fruit is the last phenomenon in the development of a plant; yet the plant exists for its sake. So also there is *Dasein* for the sake of determining its attitude towards the infinite Being. This does not exclude the determination of the attitude from being the fruit of the whole developing *Dasein.*

But there is more. Even though the *Dasein* can be confronted with the infinite Being, it eschews this confrontation, for the experience of the totally other is both fascinating and terrifying. Because of this terrifying aspect, man closes himself to it. He forgets the infinite Being; he expresses it, as it were, in the psychoanalytic sense of the term. He acts as if the horizon of his world is *the* universal horizon. He deludes himself into believing that the beings as he knows and uses them coincide with Being absolutely and that his project of rational and final orders is identical with the absolute order. It is precisely in this that consists what Heidegger describes as flight, falling away to the impersonal *das Man* and unauthenticity. But then one or the other cause comes along and unmasks our forgetting as the will to forget, our not seeing as the will not to see, our not hearing as the will not to hear. And because this happens so suddenly, it appears as an irruption. It then is as if scales fall from our eyes; and all at once we know what basically we have always known—that the horizons of our world are no absolute boundary, that our projected interconnection is not the absolute order of being. Our existence has a meaning which we have not given to it, and this meaning is revealed in our encounter with the totally other. Briefly, only the acceptance of a genuine transcendence makes possible the hermeneutics of the *Dasein* as described by Heidegger. The *Dasein* is a being which, while being, is interested in its being because it has a destiny. If this destiny were nothing but a being-towards-death (*Sein zum Tode*), our passionate interest in our being would be without an explanation.

One difficulty remains. We have to indicate the philosophical basis which gives rise to the peculiar, ambiguous character of the

experience of transcendent reality. To some extent, the preceding considerations have prepared the way for answering this question.

As is the case in all ambivalent experiences, so here also it is precisely that which attracts which also repels. What makes us shudder causes us also to be jubilant. Exactly the same thing that gives rise to delight (*Wonne*) also inspires dread. In the present case the ambivalence appears to lie in the total otherness of transcendent reality, for this is the only thing which we grasp of it. The total otherness of the infinite Being elevates and crushes us. Prior to any reasoning, consideration, or speculation it fascinates us and fills our hearts with terror. It gives rise to love and dread. More accurately, it is a terrifying mystery because it is a fascinating mystery. This point seems important to me. Here, too, the negation is seen to be based upon a previous affirmation. For if transcendent reality did not appear to man as sublime and lovable we would not be obliged to determine our position with respect to it. Man would be able to remain cold, indifferent, or turn away from it. Or he could fear it as hostile or dangerous. But in that case this reality would not at all be totally other. Briefly, Heidegger is right when he describes transcendence as "nothingness" with respect to the world. But he has forgotten to add that this nothingness, in spite of its being unworldly, nonetheless is and that it is absolutely lovable.

Hope

The *Dasein* is a being which, while being, is concerned with its being because it has a destiny. But how can it find its way to this destiny? How will it discover the right means? While it is, what must be its relationship towards transcendent Being? Here, too, an essential characteristic of the *Dasein*, an *existentiale* which Heidegger neglects, comes to the foreground. Not only will the *Dasein* always and of necessity run ahead of that which it feels coming towards it—Heidegger gives an excellent description of this "running-forward-in-thought" (*Vorlaufen*)[45]—but it will also always consider its future from the viewpoint of the genuine possibilities offered for a meaningful self-determination. This pre-predicative anticipation of genuine possibilities by the *Dasein* we call hope. The *Dasein*, which really knows that it has a transcendent destiny, does not despair. It does not despair because it hopes; and it hopes because it sees genuine possibilities for reaching its transcendent destiny.

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 306 f.

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THE USE OF ANALOGY IN THE *SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES*

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Not all analogy is analogy of proportionality. It is true that this kind of likeness is first discovered in the predication of being. Introductory metaphysics texts lead the student through the nonunivocal, nonequivocal arguments to point out to him the analogy between the proportions within being. But analogy does not stop there. It is even true to say that in his *Summa contra Gentiles* St. Thomas did not even begin there. He has written in the First Book that the names said of God and creatures are predicated according to an order to something one. This is not the reference of two things to a third, as animal and medicine are called healthy according to the order each has to the one health, but according as the order is between the analogates themselves. As being is said of substance and accident, according as an accident has reference to a substance, so names are predicated of God and creatures.[1]

Into this framework St. Thomas will set his use of analogy. It is therefore necessary first to examine the relation between substance and accident.

Analogical Predication According as Two Things Have a Relation, Not to Some Other Thing, but to One of Them

Limiting our discussion to the *Contra Gentiles* alone, we find St. Thomas defining (giving a "ratio" of) substance, not as that which stands under (*substat*) accidents nor as a *per se* being, but as "a thing to which it belongs to be not in a subject,"[2] the word "thing" being taken from the standpoint of quiddity, just as the word "being" is understood from that of existence. Therefore the meaning of substance is that it has a quiddity or essence to which it is fitting to exist not in another.

On the other hand, for St. Thomas as for Aristotle, "the being of an accident is by inherence." [3] This means that the "beingness" of accident is that it be in another, since in order to be individualized, to exist, it must be in a subject. Now this subject is substance; and except for God, there is in each substance something besides its

[1]The English quotations in this article have been taken from St. Thomas Aquinas, *On the Truth of the Catholic Faith. Summa contra Gentiles*, Book I, trans. Anton C. Pegis; Book II, James F. Anderson; Book III, Vernon J. Bourke; Book IV, Charles J. O'Neil (New York: Hanover House, 1955-57). All the Latin quotations are from S Thomae de Aquino, *Summa contra Gentiles* (Romae: Apud Sedem Commissionis Leoninae, Editio Manualis, 1934).

"Sic igitur ex dictis relinquitur quod ea quae de Deo et rebus aliis dicuntur, praedicantur neque univoce neque aequivoce, sed analogice: hoc est, secundum ordinem vel respectum ad aliquid unum.

"Quod quidem dupliciter contingit. Uno modo, secundum quod multa habent respectum ad aliquid unum: sicut secundum respectum ad unam sanitatem animal dicitur sanum ut eius subjectum, medicina ut eius effectivum, cibus ut conservativum, urina ut signum.

"Alio modo, secundum quod duorum attenditur ordo vel respectus, non ad aliquid alterum, sed ad unum ipsorum: sicut *ens* de substantia et accidente dicitur secundum quod accidens ad substantiam respectum habet, non quod substantia et accidens ad aliquid tertium referantur.

"Huiusmodi igitur nomina de Deo et rebus aliis non dicuntur analogice secundum primum modum, oporteret enim aliquid Deo ponere prius: sed modo secundo" (I, cap. 34).

[2]"Oportet igitur quod ratio substantiae intelligatur hoc modo, quod substantia sit *res cui conveniat esse non in subiecto*; nomen autem rei a quidditate imponitur, sicut nomen *entis* ab esse; et sic in ratione substantiae intelligitur quod habeat quidditatem cui conveniat esse non in alia" (I, cap. 25, fin.).

[3]"Nec possunt per se subsistere: cum 'accidentis esse sit inesse' (*Metaph.* IV, vii; 1017a). Accidentia etiam, cum sint formae, individuari non possunt nisi per subiectum" (IV, cap. 62.)

[4]"Omnis res est per hoc quod habet esse. Nulla igitur res cuius essentia non est suum esse, est per essentiam suam, sed participatione alicuius, scilicet ipsius esse. Quod autem est per participationem alicuius, non potest esse primum ens: quia id quod aliquid participat ad hoc quod sit, est eo prius" (I, cap. 22).

[5]"Substantia non dependet ab accidente: quamvis accidens dependeat a substantia" (I, cap. 23).

[6]"Ipsum enim esse non potest participare aliquid quod non sit de essentia sua: quamvis id quod est possit aliquid aliud participare. Nihil enim est formalius aut simplicius quam esse. Et sic ipsum esse nihil participare potest. Divina autem substantia est ipsum esse. Ergo nihil habet quod non sit de substantia. Nullum ergo accidens ei inesse potest" (I, cap. 23).

[7]"In huiusmodi autem analogica praedicatione ordo attenditur idem secundum nomen et secundum rem quandoque, quandoque vero non idem. Nam ordo nominis sequitur ordinem cognitionis: quia est signum intelligibilis conceptionis.

"Quando igitur id quod est prius secundum rem, invenitur etiam cognitione prius, idem invenitur prius et secundum nominis rationem et secundum rei naturam: sicut substantia est prior accidente et natura, inquantum est causa accidentis; et cognitione, inquantum substantia in definitione accidentis ponitur. Et ideo *ens* dicitur prius de substantia quam de accidente et secundum rei naturam et secundum nominis rationem" (I, cap. 34).

[8]*Ibid.*

[9]"Ex hoc autem quod mente concipitur quod profertur hoc homine Deus, non sequitur Deum esse nisi in intellectu. Unde nec oportebit id quo maius cogitari non potest esse nisi in intellectu" (I, cap. 11).

essence or quiddity because it is not the nature of that substance to be.[4]

The strict relation of dependence of accident on substance is expressed by St. Thomas in his discussion of the impossibility of discovering accidents in God.[5] He argues that existence itself cannot participate in something that is not of its essence, although an existent can participate in something else. The reason is that nothing is more formal or more simple than existence. Therefore existence itself can participate in nothing; but since the divine substance is existence itself, it follows that He has nothing that is not of His substance.[6]

Thus St. Thomas likens the predication of being to substance and accident insofar as accident bears a relation to substance, to the predication of names to God and creatures insofar as creatures bear a relation to God. And since the relationship in the first place is one wherein accident depends upon substance for its being, so shall we see some sort of likeness of that relation to the dependence of creatures on God. The analogy in question is based on the single relationship of dependence and implies a greater or lesser participation in being.

Mode of Relationship as to Name[7]

St. Thomas then examines a twofold mode of relationship in this type of analogical predication, as to name and as to thing; that is, analogy in the order of knowledge and in the order of reality. In some analogical predication there is sometimes the same order or relationship (*ordo*) observed both according to the name and according to the thing and sometimes only according to one. St. Thomas examines each. "For the order of the name follows the order of knowledge, because it is the sign of an intelligible conception."[8]

Now for the Angelic Doctor every name is appointed to signify the nature or essence of a thing, for we name a reality according to the mode of signification of that name to us. Thus, if when we say *God*, we thereby signify something than which nothing greater can conceived, the mode of signification there is that of mental existence; and for this reason we cannot attribute real existence to God through this quasi-demonstration.[9]

The relationship of name follows the relationship of knowledge, for

we must first know what a thing is before we name it. The principle of all the knowledge which the reason acquires about a thing is the understanding of that thing's essence, because, according to Aristotle, the principle of demonstration is *what a thing is.* Therefore it will follow that our knowledge of a thing will be in proportion to our understanding of that thing's essence. Thus there is a priority of knowledge over name.

Simultaneity in Priority in Relationship of Name and Thing

St. Thomas, however, is aiming to establish an instance of analogical predication wherein we find a simultaneous priority both to name and to thing. He returns to the substance/accident relationship, showing that the former is prior to accident both in nature—since substance is the cause of accident—and in knowledge, inasmuch as substance is placed in the definition of accident. Therefore, because of this relationship, when the predication of *being* is made of both principles, substance is said to be *being* prior to accident both in reality and in the meaning of the word.

The priority of being to substance rather than to accident in the order of knowledge stems from the definition of substance already given; namely, a quiddity to which it is fitting not to exist in another.[10] Now, essence is related to existence as potency to act, but accidents do not enter into the essence of a thing. Hence we must suppose priority of being to substance as to the meaning of the word.

In reality, substance is prior to accident because of the dependence of accident on substance, and that which is not dependent upon another can sometimes be found without it.[11]

We find here a further development of the substance/accident rela-

[10]See n. 2.

[11]St. Thomas gives the example of *white* and *musical* being found in Socrates and *musical* without *white* in Plato and concludes that it is possible to find *white* without *musical* in some subject (I, cap. 13) but never suggests that the accidents be found in no subject.

[12]See I, cap. 23, second argument, for an interesting angle from efficient causality of accidents in order to disprove the possibility of accidents in God.

[13]"Quia enim omnia accidentia sunt formae quaedam substantiae superadditae, et a principiis substantiae causatae; oportet quod eorum esse sit superadditum supra esse substantiae, et ab ipso dependens" (IV, cap. 14).

[14]"Quando vero id quod est prius secundum naturam, est posterius secundum cognitionem, tunc in analogicis non est idem ordo secundum rem et secundum nominis rationem : sicut virtus sanandi quae est in sanativis, prior est naturaliter sanitate quae est in animali, sicut causa effectu: sed quia hanc virtutem per effectum cognoscimus, ideo etiam ex effectu nominamus. Et inde est quod *sanativum* est prius ordine rei, sed animal dicitur per prius *sanum* secundum nominis rationem" (I, cap. 34).

tionship than was observed in the first distinction drawn by St. Thomas. There he treated of the intrinsic dependence of accident on substance, the union of the two resulting in an existent, a real being. In his second use, it is to show not the mutual ordering of the two to being, but rather in predication that substance is prior to accident both in nature and in knowledge. The substance/accident relationship can be used as an exemplification of the relation of creatures to God in the real order but not in the order of predication. A predominant strain in the First Book of the *Summa contra Gentiles* is the denial of any natural a-priori knowledge of God and an assertion that a-posteriori reasoning is possible because effects resemble their causes.

However, it is fitting that we examine with more detail into the natural priority of substance to accident. Substance is prior to accident in the first way, St. Thomas says, as cause to effect. Now, if the constitutive factors of a being are substance and accident and if it is the nature of accidents to exist in another, then substance must be its cause, at least insofar as it is that in which the accident comes to be.[12] In a later book, he will speak of proper accidents as forms superadded to substance, which are caused by the principles of that substance, from which it follows that the existence of accidents is something additional to the existence of the substance and dependent on it.[13] Even if here the substance seems to mean a subsisting being, it nevertheless is clear in regard to the causal relation it bears toward accident.

However, if we are to treat substance according to the definition as that which has a quiddity to which it is fitting not to be in a subject, then since essence is in potency to existence, it follows that *being* is said more properly of substance in the natural order.

Too, that which is in a thing accidentally is there through some cause, since it is added to the essence of that in which it is. This, however, causes only a mode of accidental existence, not substantial, and therefore can be caused by the substance itself.

Priority in Nature but Posteriority in Name[14]

St. Thomas then points out the other kind of relationship which, in analogical terms, involves a different order according to reality and

the meaning of the name. The example from which St. Thomas establishes the order is that of *health-giving*, which is predicated of medicine *per prius* according to nature but *per posterius* according to the meaning of the term. The priority in nature is one of cause to effect; yet since we know this power through its effect, we name it from that effect. For this reason, *health-giving* is first in the order of reality and yet *healthy* is predicated of animal first according to the meaning of the term.

Conclusion of the Second Distinction [15]

So is it when we come to the knowledge of God. Knowledge for us must come from other things; so the reality of the names predicated of God and other things is first in God according to His mode, but the meaning of the name is applied to Him afterwards. What we know first are the effects of God's power, goodness, wisdom, and so on; and because they are effects, they are unequal to the power of their cause. Yet our intellect can be led by these sensibles to some knowledge of the divine essence, though a perfect comprehension of it is impossible. Accordingly, having been guided by the effects, our intellect is led " to the point of knowing about God that He exists, and other such characteristics that must be attributed to the First Principle." [16]

Nor is this prejudicial to God's simplicity; for our intellect, unable to encompass God in His simplicity, considers Him rather under a manifold relationship, referring Him to some of the many things of which He is the principle. Therefore, although we say many things of God, we say them according to a mode which does not jeopardize but rather witnesses to His great simplicity.

Let us take an example of *being* to explain this natural priority of

[15]"Sic igitur, quia ex rebus aliis in Dei cognitionem pervenimus, res nominum de Deo et rebus aliis dictorum per prius est in Deo secundum suum modum, sed ratio nominis per posterius" (I, cap. 34).

[16]I, cap. 3.

[17]"Ostensum est enim supra per demonstrationen Aristotelis, esse aliquam primam causam efficientem, quam Deum dicimus. Efficiens autem causa suos effectus ad esse conducit. Deus igitur aliis essendi causa existit" (II, cap. 6).

[18]"Deus autem est ipsum esse" (I, cap. 25).

[19]"Deus autem est primum ens, quo nihil est prius" (I, cap. 22).

[20]"Unde et nominari dicitur a suis causatis" (I, cap. 34).

[21]I, cap. 29, fin.

[22]I, cap. 18.

[23]"Habent enim effectus suarum causarum suo modo similitudinem, cum agens agat sibi simile: non tamen effectus ad perfectam agentis similitudinem semper pertingit" (I, cap. 8).

God's knowledge over our cognition. Following the proof of Aristotle which shows the impossibility of proceeding to infinity in efficient causes, St. Thomas reaches a first efficient cause which is God. Now it is the nature of this cause to bring its effects into being [17] since He is the fullness of being.[18] But every being that is not its own being is being by participation, and participation must necessarily lead us back to the unparticipated, the first being.[19] Therefore, being is first in God in its fullness, but the meaning of the name is in Him after our experimental grasp of the nature of being.

God Is Named from His Effects [20]

St. Thomas concludes, then, that God will be named from His effects. Although effects that fall short of their causes cannot be predicated univocally of the agent, yet there must be some likeness between cause and effect. Everything acts according as it is in act. It is necessary, then, that the form of the effect be found in its transcendent cause in some way.

Also, it is more fitting to say that a creature is like to God than that God is like a creature.[21] The basis of likeness is dependent upon the possession of a quality or form of that to which it is likened. But God is perfectly simple, as St. Thomas proves in the beginning of the First Book.[22] Therefore, all creatures bearing a likeness to Him participate in the perfection which is found in its totality in God.

Nor does this naming of God from His effects point to an assimilation of God to any created thing. For assimilation denotes movement toward similarity and consequently applies to one that receives its similarity from another. But God could not be said to receive His perfection in question from a creature, but *vice versa.*

That this naming of God in this way is inadequate is evident :

> For effects bear within themselves, in their own way, the likeness of their causes, since an agent produces its like; yet an effect does not always reach to the full likeness of its cause.[23]

Conclusion to the First Part

St. Thomas had concluded the chapter under consideration by affirming that since we come to a knowledge of God from other

things, the reality in the names said of God and other things belongs by priority in God according to His mode of being. However, we know those names only from His effects and thus the meaning of the name belongs to God by posteriority.

The relationship of creatures to God is that of effects to cause, and thus it is in the analogy of efficient causality that we shall find St. Thomas's method of analogy in the *Summa contra Gentiles.*

Determination of the Problem

In the first distinction which St. Thomas drew in order to explain how terms could be predicated of God and creatures, he likened the

[24]II, cap. 6.

[25]This causal action will be either creation (where there is required only a being-in-act and the effecting in another of that which exists in the agent in some way) or the operation of secondary causality (the requirements for which were given at the beginning of this section).

See George P. Klubertanz, S.J., "Causality in the Philosophy of Nature," The Modern Schoolman, XIX (1942), 30, where he describes the analogous nature of the concept of cause. "When God causes, His activity is spoken of as creation. His activity is proportioned to His nature so that it is supremely independent and total in respect of the effect. When a creature causes, substantially its activity is spoken of as generation. The creature's activity is likewise proportioned to its nature, so that it is dependent on the concurrence of God on the active side. In respect of the effect, creaturely causation is only partial, in the sense that it can work only within the limits of a pre-existing subject."

[26]"Procedit autem Philosophus alia via in II *Metaphys.* (Ia, II; 994 a), ad ostendendum non posse procedi in infinitum in causis efficientibus, sed esse devenire ad unam causam primam: et hanc dicimus Deum. Et haec via talis est. In omnibus causis efficientibus ordinatis primum est causa medii, et medium est causa ultimi: sive sit unum, sive plura media. Remota autem causa, removetur id cuius est causa. Ergo, remoto primo, medium causa esse non poterit. Sed si procedatur in causis efficientibus in infinitum, nulla causarum erit prima. Ergo omnes aliae tollentur, quae sunt mediae. Hoc autem est manifeste falsum. Ergo oportet ponere *primam causam efficientem esse.* Quae Deus est" (I, cap. 13).

[27]Maritain notes that though an infinite series is certainly not impossible in itself, it is impossible here where we are searching for a reason of being and an "infinite series" is not a "reason of being" (J. Maritain, *The Degrees of Knowledge*, trans. Bernard Wall [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938], p. 275).

See the note (*ibid.*) where the author contrasts St. Thomas's and Aristotle's use of intermediary causes. For the latter, the series of subordinate causes leads to the Prime Mover, while with St. Thomas this series serves as only an intermediary means to make the fact visible that "in any case it cannot carry on this process to infinity, and as a result the structure of this causal series does not interest metaphysics, for in fact the Pure Act to whom these ways lead will be explicitly known as the *creator*, and the creation of things admits of no intermediary."

Cf. E. Gilson, *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*, trans. A. H. C. Downes (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), Chap. iv.

problem to the predication of *being* to substance and accident. The reason why *being* can be predicated of these two principles is due to the relation which accident bears to substance. This relation, as we have mentioned, is one of dependence; and, *mutatis mutandis*, the same remarks apply to God and creatures.

The relation of dependence is the relation of effect to cause, for whatever does not have in its nature the cause of its being owes its existence to another.[24] We intend, then, to study this causal relation and to conclude to its analogous character.

Efficient Causality

The nature of causality as such has reference to the coming-to-be of something. This in turn requires that there be a being-in-act, a potency in which the action is terminated, and that something of the being of the cause is actualized in the being of that which undergoes the effect. Thus we must postulate an act/potency relation whereby the cause, insofar as it is in act, brings about that which was not, but could be, in the effect. It follows that a thing can act, or cause to become in another, only that which is actually contained in itself.[25]

Cause of Being

We are restricting our causal analysis to the gift of being; and therefore, to see the relation between God and creatures, it is necessary to see Him as the cause and fullness of being.

Following Aristotle's proof in the second book of the *Metaphysics*, St. Thomas shows the impossibility of an infinite number of efficient causes.[26] Granting that things exist which at one time were non-existent, we must concede some efficient cause. But there is an order in efficient causes whereby the first causes the intermediate which in turn causes the ultimate. The intermediate cause may be one or many. Now, if the cause is removed, that which it causes is removed insofar as a cause must be in act. The intermediate cannot be a cause because its causality is received; and even if an infinite number is postulated, there will still be need for one first cause which we know as God.[27]

Fullness of Being

That He is the fullness of being can likewise be drawn from Aristotle. For St. Thomas shows from the Philosopher,[28] that those things which excel as true, excel as beings and that a maximum of supreme truth can be attained since assertions are measured by it. Since in two things, one can be falser than the other, it follows that one is also truer. Truth is measured by the degree that it approaches to excellence in being and so there must be something that is supremely being.

St. Thomas uses another way of arriving at this same conclusion. For he says that within each genus there is something which reaches

[28]"Potest etiam alia ratio colligi ex verbis Aristotelis. In II enim *Metaphys.* (I*a*, I, 5, 993b) ostendit quod ea quae sunt maxime vera, sunt et maxime entia. In IV autem *Metaphys.* (III, IV, 27, 28; 1008b) ostendit esse aliquid maxime verum, ex hoc quod videmus duorum falsorum unum altero esse magis falsum unde oportet ut alterum sit etiam altero verius; hoc autem est secundum approximationem ad id quod est simpliciter et maxime verum. Ex quibus concludi potest ulterius esse *aliquid quod est maxime ens.* Et hoc dicimus Deum" (I, cap. 13).

[29]"In unoquoque genere est aliquid perfectissimum in genere illo, ad quod omnia quae sunt illius generis mensurantur: quia ex eo unumquodque ostenditur magis vel minus perfectum esse, quod ad mensuram sui generis magis vel minus appropinquat; sicut album dicitur esse mensura in omnibus coloribus, et virtuosus inter omnes homines. Id autem quod est mensura omnium entium non potest esse aliud quam Deus, qui est suum esse. Ipsi igitur nulla deest perfectionum quae aliquibus rebus conveniant: alias non esset omnium communis mensura" (I, cap. 28).

[30]See R. Johann, S.J., "A Comment on Secondary Causality," The Modern Schoolman, XXV (1957), 19-25, where he distinguishes between the cause of *esse* and *fieri*, of *esse simpliciter* and *esse hoc*. To cause *esse simpliciter* is proper to God alone, but the very nature of efficient causality presupposes that *esse* is effected. Hence to be an efficient cause is somehow to effect *esse*. But *esse* cannot be caused independently of form; and therefore, secondary causes, sharing in the communication of *esse*, effect *esse hoc* and at the same time effect form as actuated by *esse*.

[31]"Sic enim omnes perfectiones in rebus aliis inventas Deo attribui diximus sicut effectus in suis causis aequivocis inveniuntur (cap. 29). Qui quidem effectus in suis causis sunt virtute, ut calor in sole" (I, cap. 31, init.).

[32]"Effectus enim a suis causis deficientes non conveniunt cum eis in nomine et ratione, necesse est tamen aliquam inter ea similitudinem inveniri: de natura enim actionis est ut agens sibi simile agat, cum unumquodque agat secundum quod actu est. Unde forma effectus in causa excedente invenitur quidem aliqualiter, sed secundum alium modum et aliam rationem, ratione cuius *causa aequivoca* dicitur. Sol enim in corporibus inferioribus calorem causat agendo secundum quod actu est; unde oportet quod calor a sole generatus aliqualem similitudinem obtineat ad virtutem activam solis, per quam calor in istis inferioribus causatur, ratione cuius sol calidus dicitur, quamvis non una ratione. Et sic sol omnibus illis similis aliqualiter dicitur in quibus suos effectus efficaciter inducit: a quibus tamen rursus omnibus dissimilis est, inquantum huiusmodi effectus non eodem modo possident calorem et huiusmodi quo in sole invenitur. Ita etiam et Deus omnes perfectiones rebus tribuit, ac per hoc cum omnibus similitudinem habet et dissimilitudinem simul" (I, cap. 29).

the maximum of perfection relative to that genus, and, by this thing, the other members of the genus are measured. White is the measure of all colors, and the virtuous the measure of all men. Hence it follows that the measure of all beings is God who is His own being, the fullness of all perfection.[29]

Efficient Causality—Analysis

It remains for us to determine the specific type of causality involved in the God/creature relationship which fundamentally is the causal influence in the existential order. For an efficient cause connotes an intrinsic dynamism of the act of existence which either causes things to be, if it has as its right that supreme act, or exercises it on that which already has received this first act. It is evident from the outset that univocal causality is not in question. Univocal causes are of the same nature as their effects, and effects correspond proportionately to their causes.[30] But in order for a thing to be, it must exist. Therefore being is the first effect. Now, God alone can be the cause of being simply, whereas creatures are rather the causes of being this particular thing; that is, a man or being white. Univocal causes, then, are not the causes of being simply, first because nothing can pre-exist outside of being, so that it can be called into being, and second, because a thing can act only insofar as it is in act. Anything whose actuality is determined to genus, species, and difference, however, cannot effect being which transcends these classifications. Hence to cause being to be *this* or *such* is the effect of a univocal cause.

Equivocity = Analogicity

There is another type of efficient causality, however, by which the effects are specifically different from the agent. St. Thomas does not differentiate but simply uses "equivocal" to designate those causes which effect something of a different nature from themselves. In this latter type of causality, the effect will retain some likeness to the cause insofar as the effect will be found in the equivocal cause virtually, as heat in the sun.[31] The question then is to determine in what precisely is the likeness found.

Whenever a causal action takes place in which the effects do not agree in name and ratio with the cause,[32] the form of the effect is

nevertheless found in some way in the transcendent cause. For this reason it is called equivocal action. The illustration given is the sun causing heat in lower bodies. Now, the heat formalized in a material substance bears some likeness, though existing in a different way, to the heat which is caused by the sun. Thus heat as it exists in the unshaded garden plot is not the same heat which, though not present in the sun, is nevertheless caused by it. Since it bears some likeness to that emanation from the sun, it can be called an effect of the sun's power.

So it is with God. The perfections which He bestows on creatures

[33]Gilson insists on the strict interpretation of analogue when referred to the universe. He says that it is no more than an analogue, for when we compare being *per se* with being caused even in its very existence, we are dealing with two orders of being, totally incommensurable and yet compossible. Still, it is an analogue; and that is to say more than that it is an effect to which an accidental resemblance to the cause has been added. "And since the effect in question here is one which all others pre-suppose—that is, being—it is precisely in its existence and substantially that the creature is an analogue of its Creator" (*Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*, p. 96).

[34]"Secundum tamen hanc similitudinem convenientius dicitur Deo creatura similis quam e converso. Simile enim alicui dicitur quod eius possidet qualitatem vel formam. Quia igitur id quod in Deo perfecte est, in rebus aliis per quandam deficientem participationem invenitur, illud secundum quod similitudo attenditur, Dei quidem simpliciter est, non autem creaturae. Et sic creatura habet quod Dei est: unde et Deo recte similis dicitur. Non autem sic potest dici Deum habere quod creaturae est. Unde nec convenienter dicitur Deum creaturae similem esse: sicut nec hominem dicimus suae imagini esse similem, cui tamen sua imago recte similis enuntiatur" (I, cap. 29).

[35]"Ipsum enim esse non potest participare aliquid non sit de essentia sua: quamvis id quod est possit aliquid aliud participare. Nihil enim est formalius aut simplicius quam esse. Et sic ipsum esse nihil participare potest" (I, cap. 23).

[36]"Subsistent *Esse*, the subsistent act *to be*, must be infinite and unique. For *esse* is the act of all things, even of forms, since nothing has actuality except insofar as it is. *To be* is most perfect, the ultimate act, participated by all, but itself participating nothing. *To be* simply, therefore, names the perfection of perfections, the fullness of perfection" (William A. Van Roo, S.J., "Matter as a Principle of Being," The Modern Schoolman, XIX [1942], 48).

[37]For example, "Nulla igitur res cuius essentia non est suum esse, est per essentiam suam, sed participatione alicuius, scilicet ipsius esse" (I, cap. 22).

"Omne autem aliud esse est quaedam sui esse secundum similitudinem participatio, ut ex praedictis aliquatenus patet" (I, cap. 75).

"Omnia, inquantum sunt, assimilantur Deo, qui est primo et maxime ens" (I, cap. 80).

"Sicut supra [cap. 75] ostensum est, Deus, volendo suum esse quod est sua bonitas, vult omnia alia inquantum habent eius similitudinem. Secundum hoc autem quod aliquid repugnat rationi entis inquantum huiusmodi, non potest in eo salvari similitudo primi esse, scilicet divini, quod est fons essendi" (I, cap. 84).

"Omnia quae a Deo esse accipiunt, necesse est ut ipsius similitudinem gerant, inquantum sunt, et bona sunt, et proprias rationes in divino intellectu habent, ut supra [capp. 40, 54] ostensum est" (I, cap. 93).

[38]See I, cap. 9, where St. Thomas gives the order of procedure for the *Summa contra Gentiles*.

He must first of all possess in their fullness because of His nature as very Being. But there nevertheless remains a likeness between the received and therefore limited perfection as it exists in creatures and that which exists essentially in Him.[33] This similarity is not to the extent that the received perfection is God, since it is impossible that the form as received exist in the creature as it is in God; and hence there is only an imperfect likeness between the two. Now, the fundamental similarity which exists between creatures and God is that of being; and it is in that respect that we are first likened to the Prime Cause.

Similarly is it true that the creature is likened to God and not God to the creature [34] from the nature of the perfection as it exists in the former. Now, qualities are found in God essentially; and when He bestows them on creatures, they are found there in a limited way. The likeness is between that which exists perfectly in God but only imperfectly in creatures. Thus it is that the creature bears a likeness to God, since everything is likened to, or measured by, that which is most perfect.

Analogy of Participation

It is now our intention to study this relation of the two analogates from the side of creatures. This will necessitate our examination of the analogy of participation, one of the species of causal analogy involving the intrinsic dependence of creatures, who owe their existence to another, upon God, who is the fullness and hence the source of existence. St. Thomas says that nothing can be said of God by participation because of His essential nature to exist, for existence cannot participate in something that is not of its essence.[35] But God's existence cannot be other than His essence [36] because that would necessitate a prior cause to the First Cause and in turn would presuppose potency in the First Being, both of which are contradictory.

Although St. Thomas refers in a number of chapters in the First Book [37] to the participation of creatures in being, it is especially in the Second Book that he deals with it at length. For, having considered those things about God which are accessible to human reason, he proceeds in this book to the study of creatures as proceeding from Him.[38]

The God/creature relationship is the only instance of the analogy of participation in being, for the very notion of participated being entails a like notion of essential being. A thing exists by its form, since it is form alone that causes the *esse* of a substance. But it is not necessary that whatever has a form by way of participation should receive it from that which is a form essentially,[39] as we know from our study of secondary causality. What is necessary for

[39]III, cap. 69. Chapters 66-69 are an illuminating study of secondary causality. The ability of a creature to act as cause is a further indication of his participated nature.

[40]"Ostensum est enim supra [lib. I, cap. 13] per demonstrationem Aristotelis, esse aliquam primam causam efficientem, quam Deum dicimus. Efficiens autem causa suos effectus ad esse conducit. Deus igitur aliis essendi causa existit" (II, 6 init.).

[41]"Primo autem ponemus . . . " (cap. 13).

[42]"Ostensum est in primo libro [lib. 1, cap. 13], per rationem eiusdem, esse aliquod primum movens immobile, quod Deum dicimus. Primum autem movens in quolibet ordine motuum est causa omnium motuum qui sunt illius ordinis. Cum igitur multa ex motibus caeli producantur in esse, in quorum ordine Deum esse primum movens ostensum est, oportet quod Deus sit multis rebus causa essendi" (II, cap. 6).

[43]"Si omne movens . . ." (cap. 13).

[44]Gilson (*Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*, pp. 74-77) contrasts the Aristotelian First Mover with the Christian Creator. The argumentation in St. Thomas seems to be constructed identically with the Greek, but the causality of Aristotle's god would fall upon a universe which does not owe its existence to him. He would be simply the first unmoved mover, the origin in the communication of movement. Movement lies at the beginning of the generation of beings, and the cause of the generative movement is the cause of the beings generated. But in the Aristotelian world all is given—creation is not in question—and hence the very being of the movement would escape the causality of the Prime Mover. Such is not the case in Christian philosophy. When St. Thomas would demonstrate creation, he needs only to recall the conclusion of his proof of God by movement. "It is obvious that if God creates things solely because He moves the causes which produce these things by their movement, God must be a mover as Creator of movement. In other words, if the proof by the first mover suffices to prove creation, then this proof must of necessity imply the idea of creation. Now the idea of creation is wanting in Aristotle, and so the Thomist proof of the existence of God, even if it merely literally reproduces an argumentation of Aristotle's, has a meaning altogether of its own, a meaning that the Greek philosophers never intended to give it" (*ibid.*, p. 76).

See also E. Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949), Chap. v.

[45]"Quod per se alicui convenit, universaliter ei inesse necesse est: sicut homini rationale, et igni sursum moveri. Agere autem aliquem effectum per se convenit enti in actu: nam unumquodque agens secundum hoc agit quod in actu est. Omne igitur ens actu natum est agere aliquid actu existens. Sed Deus est ens actu, ut in primo libro [cap. 16] ostensum est. Igitur sibi competit agere aliquid ens actu, cui sit causa essendi" (II, cap. 6.).

[46]"Signum perfectionis in rebus inferioribus est quod possunt sibi similia facere: ut patet per Philosophum, in IV *Meteororum* [cap. III, 1; 380a]. Deus autem est maxime perfectus, ut in primo libro [cap. 28] ostensum est. Ipsi igitur competit facere aliquid sibi simile ens in actu, ut sic sit causa essendi" (II, cap. 6).

us to understand here is that the act of all things by which they exist must ultimately find its cause in an unparticipated act.

God—Source of Being

First Demonstration [40]

In the First Book, St. Thomas has proved the existence of God from Aristotle's argument that it is impossible to proceed to infinity in efficient causes.[41] Now, it is the operation of an efficient cause to bring its effects to be. For this reason God is the cause of being to other things.

Second Demonstration [42]

Resting again on the proofs for God's existence as contained in the First Book, St. Thomas uses Aristotle's argument from motion to conclude to the first immovable mover.[43] It belongs to the first mover in any order of movements to be the cause of all the movements in that order. But many things come into being because of the movements of the heavens. It follows that if the heavens can cause being, God is the ultimate cause of the causality of the heavens.[44]

Third Demonstration [45]

That which is natural to a thing belongs to the whole of that nature; for example, there is no part of man that is not rational, just as there is no part of fire that does not tend upward. Now it is proper for a being in act that it produce an effect, for it is the very nature of actuality that it cause something to be. But that which is actual can act only according as it is in act. Since God, then, is being in act, it is proper that He cause being in those things which are outside Him.

Fourth Demonstration [46]

Aristotle had stated that it is a sign of perfection in things in the lower world to produce their like. But God is supremely perfect so that He can produce His like insofar as He can cause creatures to be, since He is the fullness of being.

Fifth Demonstration [47]

As we have seen before in this article, God wills to communicate His being to creatures by way of likeness. Now, since God is all powerful, He can cause this likeness to exist in creatures, to come to be, and therefore He will be the cause of their being.

Sixth Demonstration [48]

If creatures have a twofold mode of operation [49] whereby they are causes of interior actions, such as thought and volition, as well as of those which pass on to outward things so that they can make certain artifacts, then *a fortiori* God does not only understand and will but also produces effects. If creatures can exercise actuality in respect to other things, God can do so more perfectly and can exercise His activity on more distant things. It follows that if we are causes of effects outside of us, God, insofar as He is in act, can cause an effect to be.

Conclusion

Thus we have seen that if the analogous relation of substance and accident were set in a four-term ratio of proportionality over against

[47]"Ostensum est in primo libro [cap. 75] quod Deus vult suum esse aliis communicare per modum similitudinis. De perfectione autem voluntatis est quod sit actionis et motus principium: ut patet in III *de Anima* [cap. X; 433a]. Cum igitur divina voluntas sit perfecta, non deerit ei virtus communicandi esse suum alicui per modum similitudinis. Et sic erit ei causa essendi" (II, cap. 6).

[48]"Quanto alicuius actionis principium est perfectius, tanto actionem suam potest in plura extendere et magis remota: ignis enim, si sit debilis, solum propinqua calefacit; si autem sit fortis, etiam remota. Actus autem purus, qui Deus est, perfectior est quam actus potentiae permixtus, sicut in nobis est. Actus autem actionis principium est. Cum igitur per actum qui in nobis est possumus non solum in actiones in nobis manentes, sicut sunt intelligere et velle, sed etiam in actiones quae in extoriora tendunt, per quas aliqua facta producimus; multo magis Deus potest, per hoc quod actu est, non solum intelligere et velle, sed etiam producere effectum. Et sic potest aliis esse causa essendi" (II, cap. 6 fin).

[49]"Est autem duplex rei operatio, ut Philosophus tradit, in IX *Metaphysicae* [VIII, 9: 1050a]: una quidem quae in ipso operante manet et est ipsius operantis perfectio, ut sentire, intelligere et velle; alia vero quae in exteriorem rem transit, quae est perfectio facti quod per ipsam constituitur, ut calefacere, secare et aedificare" (II, cap. 1).

[50]On the "analogy of analogy" and the work that remains to be done in this area of Thomistic scholarship, see, among others, W. Norris Clarke, S.J., "What is Really Real?" *Progress in Philosophy*, ed. by James A. McWilliams, S.J., (Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1955), and Vernon J. Bourke, "Desenvolvimientos Recientes de la Filosofia Tomista," *Sapientia*, XI (1956), 215-20.

the similarity between God and creatures, the relationship itself would be analogous.[50] The similitude between God and creatures is one of participation. This results from the intrinsic composition in each created thing from the very level of its existence down to its subsequent operations. For the very fact that it need not be posits the act/potency composition within it. Hence, everything that is, exists because it participates, shares, in Him who essentially is His existence and by whom all others come to be.

Such, however, is not the case in the substance/accident relationship. Here there is no participation of accident in the beingness of substance since *per se* being is not proper to the latter. Rather it is the case here of the constitutive principles of being ordered to one another and to the one which they constitute. Hence there is more of a proportional than a participational relationship in the latter pair.

Divine Infinity: 1150-1250

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The present paper, as its title partially suggests, is intended as an introduction to a series of studies on what various theologians in Western Christendom were teaching concerning divine infinity from 1150 to 1250 in

[1]"Quia in exuberanti perfectione et totalitate Dei consistit ratio infinitatis substantiae eius, ideo post quaestiones de Dei perfectione et totalitate recto ordine sequuntur quaestio de eius infinitate; non dico adhuc in potentia, de qua erat sermo superius, sed in substantia et essentia" (Henry of Ghent, *Summae Quaestionum Ordinariarum* [Paris: Iodocus Badius Ascensius; St Bonaventure, New York: Franciscan Institute, 1950], Vol. II, a. 44, fol. 11*v*).

[2]"Post considerationem divinae perfectionis, considerandum est de eius infinitate. . . . Circa primum quaeruntur . . . *Primo:* utrum Deus sit infinitus. *Secundo:* utrum aliquid praeter ipsum sit infinitum secundum essentiam" (*ST*, I, q. 7, Introd., [Leonine-Marietti ed.], p. 32). See *ibid.*, a. 1, resp., p. 32: "Cum igitur esse divinum non sit esse receptum in aliquo sed ipse sit suum esse subsistens, . . . manifestum est quod ipse Deus sit infinitus et perfectus."

See also *Compend. Theol.*, I, cap. 18 (Marietti ed.), p. 18: "Quod Deus est infinitus secundum essentiam." *Ibid.*, cap. 20, p. 19: "Quod infinitum in Deo non importat imperfectionem."

[3]Bonaventure, *Commentarium in I Librum* Sententiarum *Magistri Petri Lombardi* (Ad Claras Aquas [Quaracchi]: Ex Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1882), d. 43, a. unicus, q. 2: "Utrum ipsa essentia divina sit infinita, sicut potentia." Also, *Opuscula Varia Theologica: Quaestiones Disputatae de Mysterio Trinitatis*, Vol. 5 of *Opera Omnia* (Ad Claras Aquas [Quaracchi]: Ex Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1882), q. 4, a. 1: "Utrum divinum esse sit infinitissimum."

Albert the Great, *Summa Theologiae*, Vol. 31 of *Opera Omnia*, ed. August Borgnet (Paris: Vives, 1895), I, tr. 3, q. 14, membrum 1, ad 2, p. 71. (Albert's position in his earlier works will be studied in an article of the present series.)

Siger of Brabant, *Questions sur la* Physique *d'Aristote*, ed. Philippe Delhaye (Louvain: Editions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1941), I, q. 25, p. 55.

Although somewhat later, see also Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones Subtilissimae super Librum XII* Metaph. *Aristotelis*, Vol. 7 of *Opera Omnia*, ed. L. Wadding (Paris: Vives, 1893), q. 13, pp. 687-9. Also, *Quaestiones Quodlibetales*, Vol. 25 of *Opera Omnia* (Paris: Vives, 1893), q. 5, p. 200.

[4]For general studies on the thought-current in the twelfth century, one may profitably consult the following: E. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York: Random House, 1955), pp. 113-78; J. de Ghellinck, S.J., *Le mouvement théologique du* XII[e] *siècle* (Paris: Desclée-de Brouwer, 1948); M. Grabmann, *Die scholastische Methode im 12. und Beginnenden 13. Jahrhundert*, Vol. II of *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1956); A. M. Landgraf, *Einführung in die Geschichte der theologischen Literatur der Frühscholastik* (Regensburg: Gregorius-Verlag vorm. Friedrich Pustet, 1948) and *Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastic* (8 vols.; Regensburg: Verlag Friederich Pustet,

an effort to eventually discover the origin of the Christian notion. Why has that century been singled out? Because after 1250 practically all Christian teachers were maintaining that God is infinitely perfect in His very being, whereas a century earlier their predecessors seem comparatively silent on the topic. Accordingly, the conclusion appears obvious that the origin of the medieval Christian conception of divine infinity may lie somewhere between those dates.

Let us take up each of those points more in detail.

After 1250

First of all, then, after the middle of the thirteenth century most theologians were describing infinity as a perfection of the divine reality itself. For example, consider Henry of Ghent, who takes up infinity immediately after discussing God's perfection and wholeness. The very notion of infinity with respect to God's substance rests, he explains, upon His abundant perfection and wholeness; and, accordingly, these latter questions are followed by those concerning infinity, which here does not have to do with power but with substance and essence.[1]

Or, again, turn to St. Thomas's introduction to the treatise, "De Infinitate Dei," in his *Summa Theologiae*. Having considered God's perfection, Aquinas begins, we must now investigate His infinity, concerning which two important queries are to be raised. First, is God infinite? Secondly, can anything except God be infinite of its very essence?[2]

And this joining of perfection to infiniteness in God's very being is also made by Bonaventure, by Albert the Great, and so on.[3]

After 1150

If we now step back to the midpoint of the twelfth century,[4] we find a significant contrast. Consider, for instance, the anonymous *Ysagoge in Theologiam*, written most likely between 1148 and 1152 by someone within Abelard's orbit of influence.[5] No entry is given for *infini* in the "Table des noms propres et des matières" of Landgraf's critical edition.[6] While investigating the divine attributes our medieval author establishes that God is supremely one,[7] immutable[8] and eternal.[9] He has special sections

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1952-1956); G. Paré, A. Brunet, P. Tremblay, *La renaissance du XII^e siècle: Les écoles et l'enseignement* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1933).

[5]See A. Landgraf, *Ecrits théologiques de l'école d'Abélard* (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1934), pp. xliv sq. and pp. lii sq.

[6]See *ibid.*, p. 325.

[7]See *ibid.*, Liber III, p. 243, l. 14 sq.: "Quod [Deus est] unus."

[8]*Ibid.*, p. 244, l. 7: "Quod immutabilis."

[9]*Ibid.*, p. 249, l. 1: "Quod eternus Deus."

on His power,[10] wisdom,[11] and will.[12] There is none, however, entitled "De Infinitate Dei." [13]

Or turn to Robert of Melun's *Sententie*, which was written after 1152 and of which a portion has recently been published in a critical edition.[14] Once again, *infini* finds no place within the "Table des noms propres

[10]*Ibid.*, p. 265: "De Potentia Dei."

[11]*Ibid.*, p. 269: "De Sapientia Dei," which is followed by "De Praescientia" (*ibid.*, p. 269), "Ad Dispositionem" (*ibid.*, p. 271), "De Providentia Dei" (*ibid.*, p. 271), "De Predestinatione" (*ibid.*, p. 272).

[12]*Ibid.*, p. 275: "De voluntate Dei."

Note that the last three attributes (power, wisdom, and will *seu* goodness) seem to be most fundamental, inasmuch as all others are reducible to them. "Quicquid enim de Deo vere dicitur, ad hec tria refertur. Si enim inmensum dicas, fortem, incorruptibilem, eternum, incommutabilem, totum hoc potentie est. Quodsi inspectorem, providum, scientem, considerantem, scrutantem et discernentem, sapientie est. Si vero mansuetum, mitem, benignum, misericordem, pium, longanimem, bonitatis est" (*ibid.*, p. 24, l. 7 sq.).

Whence arises our awareness of those three perfections? From the sensible universe. "Mundus namque sensilis liber quidam est habens in se descriptam divinitatem. Creature vero singule quasi litere aliquid circa ipsam divinitatem significantes. Mundi namque immensitas nota est divine potencie, pulcritudo sapiencie, utilitas bonitatis" (*ibid.*, p. 235, l. 23 sq.).

[13]Our author does speak of God as "immense". "Hec namque: Deus, omnipotens, eternus, inmensus et simila, secundum substantiam dicuntur. Non aliud est illi nature esse quam esse Deum, omnipotentem, eternum, inmensum, sapientem, iustum et similia. Ideoque sicut una substantia et non tres, ita unus Deus, unus omnipotens, unus inmensus, unus eternus, unus sapiens et non tres" (*ibid.*, p. 258, l. 9 sq.). He does not, however, develop the notion, reduces it to power (*ibid.*, p. 243, l. 8 sq., quoted above, n. 12, second paragraph), and seems merely to be echoing the "Symbolum 'Quicumque.'" On this latter, see H. Denzinger *et al.*, *Enchiridion Symbolorum* (29th ed.; Friburgi Brisgoviae-Barcinone: B. Herder, 1950), pp. 17 sq.

[14]Raymond-M. Martin, O.P., and R. M. Gallet, O.P., *Sententie.* Tome III of *Œuvres de Robert de Melun.* (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1947 and 1952). Volume I of this tome (hereafter designated as III-1) contains "Pars Prima" and "Pars Secunda" of Book I of Robert's treatise. Volume II (hereafter designated as III-2) contains "Pars Tertia" to "Pars Sexta." For a brief outline of the entire contents of the *Sententie*, see III-1, pp. ix-x; for a "Tabula Capitulorum" of both its books with all their parts, see III-1, pp. 57-156. On the date of composition, see III-1, p. vi: "Il faut ranger la composition de ces *Sentences* entre les années 1152-1160."

[15]*Ibid.*, III-1, p. 314; III-2, p. 416.

[16]These first three seemingly provide the foundation for all the other divine properties. As in the *Ysagoge in Theologiam* (see *supra*, n. 12, paragraphs 2 and 3), every other attribute is an aspect of one or other of these three. "Omnia enim que de Deo dicuntur ad aliquid istorum referuntur. Nam quod eternus, quod inmensus, quod fortis, quod incommutabilis, quod incorruptibilis dicitur, et alia huiusmodi, totum potentie est ascribendum. Quod autem sciens, scrutator, providus, intelligens, occultorum cognitor predicatur, nomen sapientie totum complectitur. Benignum vero, mitem, propicium, pium, misericordem esse, tantum bonitatis est divine" (*ibid.*, Liber I, Pars Secunda, c. 6 [III-1, p. 278, l. 2 sq.]). So, too, even though these three are one by identification with the divine essence, which is truly and supremely one (*ibid.*, c. 5 [III-1, p. 274, l. 28 sq.]), still they indicate a trinity of persons in God, for "power" refers to the Father, "wisdom" to the Son, and "goodness" *seu* "benignity" *seu* "will" (these last three terms in most places seem synonymous) to the Holy Spirit. See *ibid.*, c. 6, (III-1, p. 277, l. 9 sq.); *ibid.*, Pars Tertia, c. 2

et des matières."[15] In a section which might justly be called "De Divinis Nominibus," Robert explains that terms applicable to God are of two sorts. Either they express God in Himself, who is thus said to be powerful, wise, benign,[16] just, merciful, brave, pious, God, and so on.[17] Or they express Him with reference to creatures. Then He is described as creator, ruler, conserver, lord, protector, helper, liberator, commiserator, restorer, and the like.[18]

Such divine names can also be classified as "personal" or "nonpersonal," depending upon whether they directly refer to one or other of the persons in the Trinity (for instance, "potens, sapiens; . . . Pater, Filius, Spiritus Sanctus, genitor, genitus, procedens, donator, donum, ingenitus, verbum, principium non de principio, principium de principio, Ihesus, Christus, et alia que longum est enumerare") or to all three indiscriminantly ("ut creator, dominus et alia huiusmodi").[19]

Finally, terms such as "angry," "pleased," and the like are only figuratively predicable of God, who nonetheless is strictly and properly describable as "just," "good," "pious," "merciful," and so on.[20]

Under those three classifications, then, Robert of Melun apparently lists all the divine names operative within his theology. *Infinity* is absent from every list.

Our final instance, Peter Lombard's *Libri IV Sententiarum*,[21] is slightly more complex, since on at least three occasions he uses the word "infinite" with reference to God, although nowhere developing it or applying it directly to the divine essence itself.

The term occurs once when he discusses the omnipotence of God.

(III-2, p. 13, l. 5 sq.). Each of the three receives detailed development and discussion—"power" throughout the 71 chapters of "Pars Septima," "wisdom" in the 117 chapters of "Pars Octava," and "will" in the 103 chapters of "Pars Nona." See *ibid.*, "Tabula Capitulorum," III-1, pp. 71-89.

[17]"Est autem alia nominum species Deo convenientium, id est que ipsi Deo ex ipso tantum conveniunt, nullo respectu ad creaturas habito. Cuiusmodi ista sunt: potens, sapiens, benignus, iustus, misericors, fortis, pius, Deus, et alia multa que licet non enumerentur ex enumeratis satis nosci possunt. Nullam enim habent causam, nisi ipsam divinam essentiam, ex qua ei conveniant" (*ibid.*, Pars Tertia, c. 4 [III-2, p. 40, l. 3 sq.]).

[18]"Horum autem, id est vocabulorum, tam ex ipso quam ex nobis ei convenientium, alia sunt que conveniunt ei secundum universitatem creaturam, ut ista: creator, gubernator, conservator. Alia sunt que secundum solam rationalem creaturam ei conveniunt, ut: Dominus, protector, adiutor, liberator, miserator, retributor" (*ibid.*, c. 3 [III-2, p. 38, l. 20 sq.]).

[19]*Ibid.*, c. 7 (III-2, p. 47, l. 1 sq.).

[20]*Ibid.*, Pars Quinta, c. 50 (III-2, p. 267, l. 10 sq.).

[21]On its date of composition, see J. de Ghellinck, S.J., *Le mouvement théologique*, p. 222: "La composition se fixe, avec une certitude toujours grandissante, vers l'année 1150-1151." Recently, though, D. Van den Eynde in "Nouvelles précisions chronologiques sur quelques œuvres theologiques du XII^e siècle," *Franciscan Studies*, XIII (1953), 110-18, has placed its date between 1153 and 1157, with a preference for 1157.

The triune God, Peter reasons, truly is all-powerful because He can accomplish both whatever He wishes to do (*quidquid vult fieri*) and whatever He wishes to be able to do (*quidquid vult se posse*).[22] Those, however, who claim that God can do nothing more or better or less than what He actually has done, obviously are restricting and curtailing His power, *which is infinite.*

> Quidam tamen de hoc sensu gloriantes, Dei potentiam coarctare sub mensura conati sunt. Cum enim dicunt : Hucusque potest et non amplius, quid est hoc aliud, quam eius potentiam, quae infinita est, restringere et concludere ad mensuram? Aiunt enim : Non potest Deus aliud facere quam facit, nec melius facere id quod facit, nec aliquid praetermittere de his quae facit.[23]

Divine power, then, is affirmed to be infinite. But such an affirmation, which actually is not original with Lombard but is an almost literal

[22]See *Petri Lombardi Libri IV Sententiarum* (hereafter referred to as *Sent.*) (2nd ed.; Ad Claras Aquas [Quaracchi]: Ex Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1916), I, d. 42, c. 3, p. 263.

[23]*Ibid.*, d. 43, c. unicum, p. 263. According to the Quaracchi editors (*ibid.*, n. 3), Abelard is among the "quidam" holding this reprehensible theory, which he later retracted.

[24]*De Sacram.*, I, Pars Secunda, c. 22 (*PL* 176, 214). For an English translation, see R. J. Deferrari, *Hugh of Saint Victor on the Sacraments of the Christian Faith* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1951).

[25]Infinity is thus predicated of power by Aristotle, Plotinus, Pseudo-Dionysius, and so on, as I hope to establish in a book being prepared for publication and tentatively entitled *Divine Infinity: A Study in Aristotle, Plotinus, Proclus, Pseudo-Dionysius,* Liber de Causis *and Thomas Aquinas.* That Thomas himself recognized this sort of infinity is clear from his *Qu. Disp. de Potentia,* 1, 2 resp. ad finem. Bonaventure's view of an infinity of power, however, seems different, since for him an infinity of being can be established from one in power (see *Comment. in I Sent.*, d. 43, a. unicus, qu. 2, "Et quod sic videtur: *Prima . . . Secunda*" [Quaracchi ed.], p. 769).

[26]*Sent.*, I, d. 8, c. 3, p. 61; *ibid.*, c. 6, p. 63.

[27]*Ibid.*, c. 7, p. 63.

[28]*Ibid.*, c. 8, p. 64.

[29]"Idem [Hilarius] in VIII libro *De Trinitate:* 'Non humano modo ex compositis Deus est, ut in eo aliud sit quod ab eo habetur, et aliud sit ipse qui habeat, sed totum vita est, natura scilicet perfecta et infinita et non ex disparibus constituta, sed vivens ipsa per totum' " (*ibid.*).

[30]This presumption is valid only if Peter had the entire *De Trinitate* itself at hand. This is not completely certain, since he may have been acquainted with only sections of the treatise through one or other of the *florilegia* then current. See *ibid.*, "Prolegomena," pp. xlvi sq. For a list of passages from Hilary's *De Trinitate* which Lombard utilizes in his *Sentences*, see *ibid.*, II, "Index Auctorum," p. 1054.

[31]The Latin text used is H. Hurter, S. J., *Sancti Hilarii Pictaviensis Episcopi* De Trinitate *Libri XII* (hereafter referred to as *De Trin.*) (Oeniponti: Libraria Academica Wagneriana, 1887). This edition (see *ibid.*, p. v) basically reproduces the text of J. P. Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, vol. X. For an English translation, see Stephen McKenna, *Saint Hilary of Poitiers: The Trinity.* Vol. 25 of *Fathers of the Church Series.* (New York: Fathers of the Church, Inc., 1954).

[32]*De Trin.*, I, c. 4, p. 5.

quotation from Hugh of St. Victor's *De Sacramentis Christianae Fidei*,[24] is not necessarily identical with saying the very being of God is infinite, for infinity can be predicated of power simply through "extrinsic denomination"; since God is powerful enough to cause an infinite number of endlessly varied creatures, the divine power can be characterized as infinite but only with respect to its effects, to which alone the term properly and, so to speak, intrinsically belongs.[25] In itself, accordingly, the present affirmation is not necessarily an anticipation of the mid-thirteenth-century doctrine of divine infinitude.

The term again shows up in Lombard's investigation of God's simplicity. Why, he asks, is the divine nature simple? Because it excludes absolutely every sort of parts and accidents,[26] and this to such an extent that even *substance* cannot suitably be predicated of it, because such a term connotes inherence, incompleteness, composition.[27] In fact, its simplicity is so great that there is nothing in it which is not totally identified with it (*non est in ea aliquid quod non sit ipsa*) so that each divine person *is* that nature, for the possessor and the possessed are completely one and the same (*idem est habens et quod habetur*).[28] Consequently let us say with St. Hilary that God is not composed of distinct parts in a human fashion, so that what is possessed is other than he who possesses. "Rather in God everything *is* life—namely, a nature which is perfect, absolute and infinite, which is not made up of unlike parts but is everywhere living."[29]

What, then, does Lombard mean by the phrase, "a nature which is . . . *infinite*," repeated from St. Hilary? Since the former gives no explanation here or, seemingly, elsewhere, we can gain no information unless we presume that his meaning is perhaps the same as that of the Bishop of Poitiers.[30] Under that presumption, "an infinite nature" would be equivalent to an *eternal* one, as briefly investigating Hilary will reveal.

Early in my search for God, Hilary explains,[31] I was convinced that what is divine must also be eternal.[32] Imagine my joy and admiration when I came upon God's own testimony about Himself in Exodus 3, 14: "I am Who am," and again, "Thus shalt thou say to the children of Israel: He who is, hath sent me to you." Obviously, God's own clear definition of Himself completely harmonized with my own previous conviction that the Divine is the Eternal. For nothing is more characteristic of God than to be (*non enim aliud proprium magis Deo quam esse*), because that which truly is (*Id ipsum quod est*) is not to be found among things which will one day end or which had a beginning. But that which combines eternity with the power of unending happiness could never not have been, nor is it possible that one day it will not be, because what is divine is not liable to destruction, nor does it have a beginning. And since eternity in God does not lack any of its own properties, He has revealed to us in a fitting manner this fact alone, that He is, in order to

render testimony to His everlasting eternity.[33] Accordingly, "the words of Him who said, 'I am Who am,' seem to have fully expressed this meaning of infinity." [34]

This same equating of eternity and infinity Hilary continues to make. How can God, according to Isaias 40, 12, hold the entire heavens in His palm and the entire earth in His hand? Because His powerful infinity (*ipsa illa infinitas potens*) embraces absolutely all creatures in its eternal grasp. He is in them and outside of them, reaching beyond them and being found within them; that is, poured about everything and permeating everything. And the Whole which is God Himself contains all things that are within and without; nor is He, the infinite One, absent from all things, nor are all things not present within Him who is infinite.[35]

And my soul was filled with joy, the bishop adds, upon becoming aware that it worshiped a Father and Creator who is infinite in boundless eternity (*immensae aeternitatis infinitatem*). And even more intently I

[33]*Ibid.*, c. 5, pp. 5-6.

[34]"Et ad hanc quidem infinitatis significationem satisfecisse sermo dicentis: *Ego sum qui sum*, videbatur" (*ibid.*, c. 6, p. 6). The same interpretation of Exodus, 3, 14, and of infinity is given in *ibid.*, XII, c. 24, pp. 575-76.

[35]"Atque ita totus ipse intra extraque se (cuncta) continens, neque infinitus abesset a cunctis, neque cuncta ei qui infinitus est non inessent" (*ibid.*).

[36]*Ibid.*, c. 7, p. 9. The expression *infinitas immoderatae aeternitatis* occurs in *ibid.*, c. 6, p. 8.

[37]*Ibid.*, c. 7, p. 9.

[38]*Ibid.*, c. 8, p. 10.

[39]*Ibid.*, c. 10, p. 11.

[40]On God the Holy Spirit, see *ibid.*, c. 36, p. 38, and *passim*.

[41]*Ibid.*, I, c. 11, p. 12. See *ibid.*, XII, c. 21, p. 574: "Quod vero ex aeterno natum est, id si non aeternum natum est, jam non erit et Pater auctor aeternus. Si quid igitur ei, qui ab aeterno Patre natus est ex aeternitate defuerit, id ipsum auctori non est ambiguum defuisse: quia quod gignenti est infinitum, infinitum est etiam nascenti." This last text Lombard quotes without comment in *Sent.*, I, d. 9, c. 4, pp. 71-72.

[42]*De Trin.*, I, c. 13, p. 15.

[43]*Ibid.*, pp. 16-17. Heresies arise precisely because impiously rash men measure the powerful nature of God by the weakness of their own nature. Instead of attaining an infinite and thereby adequate knowledge of infinite things, they confine such infinite items within the boundaries of their own human cognition (*ibid.*, c. 15, p. 18). In place of such a procedure, they should, when they hear the inspired writers speak of God, let their way of knowing be conditioned by the infinite object of that knowledge (*ibid.*, c. 18, p. 21).

[44]"Sed totum quod est, vita est, natura scilicet perfecta et absoluta et infinita, et non ex disparibus constituta, sed vivens ipsa per totum" (*ibid.*, VIII, c. 43, p. 341).

[45]If infinity is restricted to eternity, is it not directly and intrinsically applied only to *duration* and to God Himself merely through extrinsic denomination? If so, such an infinity is in this respect similar to one of power. See above, pp. 42-43.

[46]That infinity and eternity are no longer synonymous is attested to by the fact that each is discussed separately. In St. Thomas, for example, *ST*, I, q. 7 is "De Infinitate Dei" and *ibid.*, q. 10 is "De Dei Aeternitate."

[47]"Unde aperitur in Trinitate summa esse perfectio. Si enim ibi deesset potentia vel sapientia vel bonitas, non esset summum bonum. Sed quia ibi est perfecta potentia, infinita sapientia, incomprehensibilis bonitas, recte dicitur et creditur summum bonum" (*Sent.*, I, d. 34, c. 3, p. 218).

began to seek what that infinite and eternal Lord might be (*ipsam illam infiniti et aeterni Domini sui speciem quaerebat*).[36] From the greatness and beauty of His effects, I realized that He is supremely great and most beautiful. And since even His works surpass our comprehension, so the Worker Himself must far exceed our grasp.[37] Indeed, the Creator is so great that, although faith provides sufficient knowledge for us in the practice of our religion, still He Himself cannot be comprehensively understood, and the infinity of His eternal power (*infinitas aeternae potestatis*) surpasses all understanding.[38]

Upon becoming familiar with the Prologue of St. John's Gospel,[39] Hilary concludes, I came to know God the Father and God the Son.[40] Then I realized that what I previously had known through natural reason about the eternity, infinity, and reality of my Creator (*de Creatoris sui aeternitate et infinitate et specie*) is properly applied also to God the Word.[41] In the Word made flesh dwells the fullness of the Godhead bodily; and in Him there is the infinity of eternal power (*infinitas aeternae potestatis*), although that power of eternal infinity (*potestas aeternae infinitatis*) eludes the comprehension of the earthly mind.[42] Even such events as Christ's suffering, death, and resurrection are beyond the understanding of our human nature, because to adequately know what an infinite eternity effects demands infinite knowledge (*infinitae aeternitatis operatio infinitam metiendi exigat opinionem*).[43]

For Hilary, then, to be infinite is to be eternal. Accordingly, when he later speaks of the divine life as a "nature which is perfect, absolute and *infinite*," [44] his meaning apparently is that the divine life is perfect, absolute, and *eternal*. And when utilized by Lombard several centuries later, this passage presumably retains the same meaning—an infinite nature is an eternal one.[45]

While granting that "eternal" is *one* signification of "infinite," theologians of the second half of the thirteenth century will maintain that infinity is a property not only of divine *duration* [46] but, more fundamentally and properly, of the divine *reality itself*. In this strict and technical sense infinity is to be located in the very essence of God—in its freedom from the determination and limitation of matter and of all potency. Since the term does not have this sense in either Hilary or Peter Lombard, who use it as a synonym for eternity, may we not justifiably conclude that both were unaware of divine infinity as later formulated?

What, finally, of Lombard's statement that divine wisdom is infinite? Obviously, he says, the triune God is supremely perfect, for in Him "are to be found perfect power, infinite wisdom and incomprehensible goodness." [47]

Since our author himself offers no on-the-spot elucidation, we must be

content to conjecture that, if the term has any distinct significance for him, it either refers to the infinite number of creatures under divine providence (and, thus, infinity would belong to wisdom itself only by a sort of extrinsic denomination) or means "eternal" (because, as previously seen, Lombard once borrowed it from Hilary with that meaning).

[48]On wisdom, see *ibid.*, d. 35 to d. 41; on power, *ibid.*, d. 42 to d. 44; on goodness or will, *ibid.*, d. 45 to d. 48.

[49]*Ibid.*, d. 34, c. 3, p. 217 sq.; *ibid.*, c. 4, p. 218.

[50]*Ibid.*, d. 3, c. 1, p. 31.

[51]"Ex perpetuitate namque creaturarum intelligitur Conditor aeternus" (*ibid.*). "Ipse vere ac proprie dicitur essentia, cuius essentia non novit praeteritum vel futurum" (*ibid.*, d. 8, c. 1, p. 57). See *ibid.*, pp. 58-9; *ibid.*, d. 19, cc. 11-12, pp. 124-5.

[52]*Ibid.*, d. 8, c. 2, pp. 59-60.

[53]*Ibid.*, cc. 3-8, pp. 61-65.

[54]"Il n'est pas d'attribut divin plus connu des théologiens que celui de l'infinité. Pourtant, nous ne connaissons personnellement aucun texte de l'Ecriture qui dise, simplement et directement, que 'Dieu est infini' " (E. Gilson, "L'infinité divine chez saint Augustin," *Augustinus Magister* [Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1954], I, 569).

[55]"Aucune des concordances bibliques consultées par nous ne contient cette formule. Aucun des théologiens qu'il nous est arrivé de lire, y compris saint Thomas d'Aquin, n'a pu nous citer en *Sed contra*, pour appuyer l'infinité divine, un seul texte scripturaire disant simplement quelque chose comme ceci: *Deus est infinitus*"(*ibid.*).

Peutlier, Etienne, Gantois *et al*, *Concordantiarum Universae Scripturae Sacrae Thesaurus* (Vol. 49 of *Cursus Sacrae Scripturae*), p. 593, list *infinitus* as occurring in eighteen Scriptural texts, in most of which, however, the word refers to creatures and merely means "innumerable" or "inexhaustible." Martin Hagen, S.J., *Lexicon Biblicum* (Vol. 6 of the same series) gives no entry to *infinitus* (see col. 761), nor does Francis Zorell, S.J., find *apeiron* or *aoriston* in the New Testament (*Novi Testamenti Lexicon Graecum*, Vol. 8 of same scriptural series, pp. 57-59). More recent concordances (e.g., N. Thompson and R. Stock, *Concordance to the Bible* [St. Louis: B. Herder, 1942], p. 524) have nothing more to offer.

What of a text like Psalm 144, 3: "Magnus Dominus et laudabilis nimis, et magnitudinis eius non est finis"? Cannot such texts suggest divine infinity? Yes, but seemingly the meaning then borne by *infinity* is either very vague—see, for instance, Augustine's *Enarratio in Ps. 144* (*PL* 37, cols. 1827A-1873B), where the term appears to be a mere synonym for "incomprehensibility" (*ibid.*: ". . . si enim capimus, magnitudinis eius est finis; si autem magnitudinis eius non est finis, capere ex eo aliquid possumus, Deum tamen totum capere non possumus"). Or, if it assumes a more definite meaning, it is what the reader puts there from his own preconceived notions—if, as for Thomas, infinity is a perfection of the divine being itself, then Psalm 144, 3 carries that meaning (see his *Contra Gentiles*, I, cap. 43).

[56]A. H. Armstrong, "Plotinus's Doctrine of the Infinite and Christian Thought," *Downside Review*, LXXIII (Winter, 1954-55), 47.

[57]See J. Owens, *Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1951), p. 306, n. 19: "Perfect Being for the Greeks meant limitation and finitude; for the Christians, the perfect Being is infinite. Limitation for the Christians denotes imperfection; while for the Greeks, imperfection was implied by infinity." Also *vide* Henri Guyot, *L'Infinité divine depuis Philon le Juif jusqu'à Plotin* (Paris: Alcan, 1906), p. 31; J. Chevalier, *La notion du nécessaire chez Aristote et chez ses prédécesseurs* (Paris: Alcan, 1915), pp. 186-88.

[58]See A. H. Armstrong, *art. cit.*: "But the idea that the First Principle of things, the supreme divinity, is itself in some sense infinite, does not seem to appear clearly and unmistakably in the Greek-speaking world before Philo of Alexandria. It is indeed an idea opposed

In either case its present usage does not forecast the thirteenth-century technical meaning.

Apart from those three occurrences of *infinite*, though, Lombard's theology does not notably differ from that of the author of the *Ysagoge in Theologiam* or of Robert of Melun in his *Sententie*. Like them, he sets up power, wisdom, and goodness as three basic attributes of God, each of which receives an *ex professo* investigation in separate distinctions.[48] Like them, he finds these three perfections to be completely one with God's essence and equally possessed by each of the Divine Persons (*pariter conveniunt tribus personis*); and, nevertheless, power is especially referred to the Father, wisdom to the Son, and goodness to the Holy Spirit.[49] Like them, he rises to divine omnipotence from the magnitude of the created universe—to divine wisdom from the good order with which creatures fit and work together, to divine goodness from their being well governed.[50] Like them, he conceives God as eternal,[51] immobile,[52] and completely simple.[53] Like them, also, he apparently attaches little importance to divine infinity of any sort and, especially, seems unaware that the divine being itself may be termed infinite in its subsistency as totally free from the limiting determination of any sort of potency—an awareness which seems vivid and common after 1250.

Additional Reflections

Incidentally, no one need be particularly surprised that these twelfth-century writers seemingly give little space to divine infinity if he realizes that the doctrine seems missing from Sacred Scripture and from early Hellenic philosophers.

Its absence in the Old and New Testaments, which explicitly mention most other divine attributes, has recently been noted by Etienne Gilson. Although every theologian recognizes infinity as a divine attribute, he remarks, still "we personally know no Scripture text which simply and directly says, 'God is infinite.'"[54] Nor, he goes on, are biblical concordances much help, and no theologian has as yet produced a single Scripture text with that direct message.[55]

Nowhere, accordingly, does the Bible seem to explicitly say, "In Himself God is infinite," and, hence, in no century need it directly and of itself inspire theological speculation on infinity as a divine attribute.

What about early Greek thought? True enough, the notion of something unbounded, unlimited, indefinite, goes back—as A. H. Armstrong recently indicated—to the very beginning of Hellenic philosophic thinking.[56] But since *apeiria* commonly suggested imperfection,[57] the Greeks were slow to link it with the divine.[58]

In the third century of the Christian era, however, infinity is clearly predicated of a Greek First Principle and conceived as a perfection when Plotinus asserts that the One is both infinite and perfect.[59] This assertion could have been a source for a Christian doctrine of divine infinity among twelfth-century theologians, as it actually was earlier for Pseudo-Dionysius[60] and, perhaps, for John Scotus Erigena.[61] But even had writers in the twelfth century built a doctrine upon that Plotinian foundation, it could hardly have begotten the theory of the following century, for the simple reason that Plotinian *apeiria* of its very nature is completely coterminous with nonbeing. The One is infinite and perfect only *because He is above being.*[62] As long, then, as theologians in the earlier century would have remained within a context wherein infinity is synonymous with non-entity, they could scarcely have directly induced those in the next century to affirm that God is infinitely perfect in His very *entity.*

Our mentioning Plotinus, however, suggests a consideration which may prove helpful later on in our projected series of articles. It is this: The

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to the normal Greek, and especially to the Platonic-Pythagorean way of thinking, for which the good and the divine is essentially form and definition, light and clarity, opposed to vague formless darkness."

[59]See E. Bréhier (editor), *Enneads* (2nd ed.; Paris: Société d'Edition "Les Belles Lettres," 1954), VI, 7, 17, 14 sq.; VI, 8, 9, 38 sq. That the One's status of formlessness and consequent infinity is linked with perfection, see VI, 7, 32, 1 sq.; V, 2, 1, 3 sq. That *aoristos*, which is the word Plotinus here applies to the One, is synonymous with *apeiros*, see L. Sweeney, S.J., "Are *Aoristia* and *Apeiria* Synonyms?" in THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, XXXIII (May, 1956), pp. 270-79.

[60]See *De Divinis Nominibus*, I, c. 1, sect. 1 (C. Pera edition in *In Librum Beati Dionysii de Divinis Nominibus Expositio* [Romae: Marietti, 1950]), no. 7: "The Infinity which is above entity transcends all entities. . . . God is an entity Who is above entity. He *is* in a way unlike any other being. Although He is the cause of being for all, yet He Himself is nonbeing insofar as He is beyond every entity." See also *Celestial Hierarchy*, chap. 2, sect. 3. (*PG* 4, 140D-141A), quoted in L. Sweeney, S. J., *art. cit.*, p. 279, n. 25.

[61]"Deus siquidem infinitus informisque, quoniam a nullo formatur, dum sit forma omnium. . . . Nam summa omnium causa per excellentiam omnium formarum finiumque informis est atque infinita. Etc." (*De Divisione Naturae*, I, c. 56 [*PL* 132, 499D sq.]).

[62]Whether the One be explicitly (see texts cited above, n. 59) or implicitly (V, 1, 7, 19 sq.; V, 5, 6, 1 sq.) described as infinite, the reason is always that He is nonbeing as above being and form. See L. Sweeney, S.J., *art. cit.*, pp. 273-75.

[63]See, for example, V, 1, 7, 19 sq. This text, as well as those cited in n. 64, is quoted in L. Sweeney, S.J., *art. cit.*, p. 272 sq.

[64]Besides the text cited in n. 63, see also VI, 7, 17, 12 sq.; V, 4, 2, 4 sq.

[65]Thus evil, both sensible and intelligible matter, the Intelligence, the Soul, and the One can be classified as "infinite," each with reference to its formless status. See L. Sweeney, S.J., *art. cit.*, p. 270 sq.

[66]With respect to the One, such infinity connotes perfection. See above, n. 59. With respect to other items enumerated in n. 65, it indicates imperfection.

[67]Ample proof for the position taken in these last three paragraphs is offered in L. Sweeney, S.J., "Infinity in Plotinus," *Gregorianum*, Vol. XXXVIII (July and October, 1957), from which these paragraphs are excerpted.

contrast between the pagan Greek's conception of divine infinity and that of a thirteenth-century Christian theologian appears to rest upon a deeper contrast within their fundamental metaphysics. According to the former, determination is linked solely with form, whereas determination for the latter is aligned with matter and potency, as well as with form and act. Let us endeavor to establish this point.

Basically, infinity is a status arising from the denial of some sort of determination. Form, which for Plotinus is identical with being,[63] is conceived as determining its recipient.[64] When for some reason or other this latter is without form and thereby without formal determination, it is automatically describable as "indeterminate" or "infinite."[65] Infinity becomes interchangeable with formlessness and non-entity, and implies imperfection depending upon whether or not the item in question *should* have form.[66]

As long, then, as determination is restricted to form, which in turn is identified with being, indetermination *seu* infinity must remain alien to being. If, however, matter and potency are conceived as exercising their own brand of determination, if they are viewed as real components performing, in their own way, as genuine and necessary a function within the composite as the form and act which they receive and limit, then a form or act which is without matter and potency is also without their determination and limitation and is, thereby, both infinite and perfect. Infinity thus becomes a perfection entirely consonant with subsistent fullness of being and form.

If our analysis is correct, the fact that Christians after the middle of the thirteenth century commonly thought of God as infinitely perfect in His very entity also implies that by 1250 they also were somehow aware that matter and potency effect their own sort of determination within a composite, whereas Plotinus by aligning *apeiria* to non-entity testifies to his lack of that awareness.[67]

And if, finally, our analysis is correct, we are provided with a sort of intellectual Geiger-counter for detecting the presence of the doctrine prior to 1250. Merely to speak of God as an "infinite being" is not sufficient guarantee, for someone might thereby mean simply that He is "infinitely powerful" (as containing the infinite number of beings which He can produce) or that He is "eternal" (as capable of lasting endlessly), in which cases infinity would apply to the divine reality itself only through extrinsic denomination. But when someone like Richard Fishacre calls God an "infinite being" because "He is infinitely removed from the bondage of matter as a completely separate substance" (*in infinitum elongatus est ab impedimentis et materia, cum sit substantia omnino*

separata),[68] then we have a sign that the doctrine may be actually present. His locating God's infinity in the divine substance's elongation from matter attests both that within a material composite matter exercises a sort of determining limitation upon its co-principle and, secondly, that

[68]*Comment. in Sent.*, I, d. 2, c. 1, [a. unicus], Solutio tertiae quaestionis (Vaticana, Ottob. lat. 294, fol. 6*va*).

[69]*Ibid.*, folios 5*vb*-6*vb*. Richard's commentary was certainly written before 1245 and, most likely, between 1240-1243. See W. A. Hinnebusch, *Early English Friars Preachers*, Fasciculus 14 of *Dissertationes Historicae* in *Institutum Historicum Fratrum Praedicatorum* (Romae: Ad Sanctam Sabinam, 1951), p. 366.

[70]Establishing when Langton wrote his *Commentarius in Sententias* is difficult. A. M. Landgraf sets the *terminus a quo* as after the beginning of the thirteenth century and the *terminus ad quem* as prior to its third decade. See his *Der Sentenzenkommentar des Kardinals Stephen Langton* (hereafter referred to as *Der Sentenzenkommentar*), Band 27, Heft 1 of *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters* (Münster Westf.: Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1952), p. xviii: ". . . den Abschluss dieses Sentenzenkommentares nicht vor dem Beginn des 13. Jahrhunderts anzusetzen." Later: "Dies mahnt, dass die Glossen [presumably, Langton's *Commentarius*] kaum nach dem dritten Jahrzehnt des 13. Jahrhunderts geschrieben worden sind" (*ibid.*, p. xix). J. Fisher, S.J., "Hugh of St. Cher and the Development of Mediaeval Theology," *Speculum*, XXXI (January, 1956), 58, uses Langton's *Commentary* as an instance of "the so-called 'catchword' gloss or running commentary, the type that predominated . . . from the last decades of the twelfth century to about 1225." According to these authors, then, we may safely locate its composition between 1200-1220.

[71]As we have previously seen (*supra* pp. 42 sq.), Lombard uses the word "infinitum" on at least three occasions: *Sent.*, I, d. 8, c. 8, p. 64; *ibid.*, d. 34, c. 3, p. 218; *ibid.*, d. 43, c. unicum, p. 263. In commenting on those places, Stephen Langton makes reference to infinity only in the first. What is meant, he asks, in saying that the divine nature is "perfect and infinite"? Merely this, that it exceeds the wisdom and goodness of every human being: "Dicitur infinita, quia non est proportionalis alicui creature humane, scilicet scientie vel bonitati" (*Der Sentenzenkommentar*, Lib. I, d. 8, p. 9).

Infinity receives little attention elsewhere. No entry is given to *infinitum* in *ibid.*, "Index rerum et nominum," p. 157. Lombard's *Sent.*, I, d. 39, p. 245 sq. and *ibid.*, III, d. 13, p. 603 sq., will provide opportunities for a later theologian such as Thomas Aquinas to dicuss infinity. (See Thomas's *In I Sent.*, d. 39, q. 1, a. 3: "Utrum Deus sciat infinita" [Mandonnet ed.], p. 924 sq.; also *In III Sent.*, d. 13, q. 1, a. 2, qu. 2: "Utrum gratia eius [Christi] fuerit infinita" [Moos ed.], p. 398 sq.). Langton's commentary on those passages offers no similar discussion (*Der Sentenzenkommentar*, Lib. I, d. 39, p. 53 sq.; *ibid.*, Lib. III, d. 13, p. 119 sq).

[72]See P. S. Moore, *Works of Peter of Poitiers* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 1936), p. 39 sq.

[73]*Infinitum* finds no place in "Index Nominum et Rerum" of his *Sententiae* (P. S. Moore and M. Dulong, *Sententiae Petri Pictaviensis* [Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 1943]), p. 324. In a chapter entitled "Distinctio Vocabulorum Utilis Que de Deo Dicuntur" and intended as an outline of topics to be treated in the rest of the Book, Peter lists the following "divine names": *essentia, divinitas et huiusmodi; potentia, sapientia, bonitas; simile, equale; Pater, Filius; Trinitas; Creator, Dominus; missus; incarnatus, humanatus; agnus, leo, caracter et huiusmodi* (*ibid.*, c. 2, p. 10-11). Manifestly, *infinitus* is absent.

[74]Besides Richard Fishacre, whose *Comment. In Sent.*, I, d. 2, c. 1 will be published in a critical edition, we hope to study the *Summa Theologiae* printed among the works of Alexander of Hales, as well as a group opposing divine infinity and referred to by both Thomas and Bonaventure as "quidam," Albert

the divine reality, precisely because total and subsistent being, is *itself* infinite in its escape from material determination.

Methodology

Having first outlined the doctrine of divine infinity as found in Western theologians after the middle of the thirteenth century and having then noted its almost complete absence in their predecessors of the previous century, as well as having indicated some additional reflections, we can now set up the methodology which our series of studies will follow.

For obvious reasons we shall use printed editions whenever available. Where none have as yet been published, we shall utilize manuscripts in the Knights of Columbus Vatican Film Library at Saint Louis University.

Secondly, we shall begin our research with 1250 and work backwards, since the more one recedes from that date, the less he finds on divine infinity. For instance, in 1243 Richard of Fishacre devotes five folio columns to the topic,[69] whereas Stephen Langton (d. 1228)[70] passes it by with not much more than an occasional nod,[71] and Peter of Poitiers, writing sometime between 1168 and 1176,[72] pays even less attention to it.[73] What this gradually decreasing prominence indicates is that the object of our search is more likely to be found living nearer to 1250 than to 1150.

Hence, although my collaborators and I plan studies on Peter of Poitiers, Praepostinus, Stephen Langton, Philip the Chancellor, Roland of Cremona, Hugh of St. Cher, and so on, still we shall first investigate Richard of Fishacre and, thereafter, others who were active in the decade immediately previous to 1250.[74] Among them, perhaps, we shall discover him who first conceived of God as infinitely perfect in His very reality.

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the Great's early commentary on Lombard's *Sentences*, Odo Rigaldus, and Thomas of York, whose *Sapientiale* postdates 1250 by a few years but whose attitude towards divine infinity is still unexplored.

The Reality of Culture

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The rapidly maturing discipline of social anthropology has appropriated as its own the intriguing study of human culture.[1] Edward Tylor (1832-1917), the Oxford professor who is rightfully titled "Father of Modern Anthropology," defined culture as "the complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by men in society."[2] Culture, a people's "common way of life,"[3] is the answer of a human society to the social, psychological, and environmental problems which beset it. It is an extensive collection of skills, ideas, and habits which grows into a social heritage and becomes the customary way of a people's thought and action.

The members of every human society invent, assimilate, and adjust traits to fulfill their own peculiar needs and desires. They create a unique pattern of life in accord with their own time, place, and history. Thus the various cultures of the world manifest rich variety. But because culture is universally of men and for men, it must possess, beneath the variety, a common theme which answers to the essential biological and metaphysical nature of its creator.

Although, as Professor Bidney remarks in his recent *Theoretical Anthropology*, "anthropologists are showing an ever increasing concern about theoretical problems," there is at present no formed body of theory on the nature of culture.[4] Hence, a philosophical investigation can begin only with the few basic premises which all anthropologists acknowledge as empirically proven.

They will generally agree that culture, as such, has four characteristic properties: first, it is of men in society; secondly, it is transmitted by education as social heritage; thirdly, it is variable both in time and space; fourthly, it constitutes a pattern of action.

Scrutiny of these properties reveals that three philosophical principles are involved. First, the fact of certain universal cultural traits, common

[1]This paper was originally given as an address to the San Francisco Branch of the Catholic Philosophical Association, November 23, 1956.

[2]Tylor, *Primitive Culture* (London, 1871), p. 1.

[3]Dawson, *Age of the Gods* (New York, 1936), p. xiii.

[4]*Theoretical Anthropology* (New York, 1953), p. iii.

[5]*In III Phys.*, lect. 5, no. 263; *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 76, a. 5 ad 4; *ibid.*, I-II, q. 95, a. 1.

[6]*Essay on Man* (New York, 1953), p. 286.

[7]Bidney, *Theoretical Anthropology*, p. 80.

[8]"The Superorganic," *American Anthropologist*, XIX (1917), 192.

to all men in every society, such as family, government, religion, and so on, indicates that at the basis of culture lies a single radically similar operative principle, or what we would call a nature. Secondly, the variability of culture reveals that this nature is not determined rigidly to one course of action but is open to a vast variety of operations. It is, then, essentially an intellectual and free nature. Thirdly, the patterns of culture are products of habit, in the fullest sense of a rationally guided and freely chosen channeling of human action toward some specific goal.

Human nature is not the closed, determined nature of other beings but open, receptive, and self-perfecting. And this not only in its higher powers but even in virtue of a certain plasticity of body. St. Thomas states a capsule philosophy of culture when he writes: "Man differs from other animals because he possesses an intellect and hands." [5]

We may provisionally define culture as a way of life characterized by a particular rational choice of ideas and habits which are perpetuated by instruction, law, and institutions such as the state and religion. This great structure is built by experience on the basic nature and needs of life, by trial and error, by perseverance and invention. Culture both flows from human life and enriches the human life in the world. It is, as Ernst Cassirer said, "man's progressive self liberation." [6]

But still, despite these clarifications, doesn't our idea of culture continue to reside in a rarified atmosphere? Anthropologists have long been plagued by its elusive nature. They ask, "What precisely *is* the reality of culture? Is it anything more than an idea, an explanatory concept? Or does it possess any substantial reality?" By asking such questions, the modern anthropologist unwittingly re-enacts the vigorous twelfth-century controversies waged over the reality of universal concepts.

Some hold tenaciously to the substantial existence of culture. Listen to Emile Durkheim:

> When the individual has been eliminated, society alone remains. We must, then, seek the explanation of culture in the nature of society itself. Since it is quite evident that it infinitely surpasses the individual in time and space, it is in a position to impose upon him ways of acting and thinking which it has consecrated with its prestige.[7]

Alfred Kroeber, dean of American anthropologists, wrote in 1917:

> The existence that we call culture transcends mind and body utterly . . . the social and cultural is in its very essence non-individual and begins only where the individual ends.[8]

Today, Leslie White of Michigan is the belligerent proponent of this theory:

> In addition to the individual organic component in human behavior and over and above the social factor which comes from the interaction of individuals, there is the influence of the tradition, customs, tools, philosophies. These . . . culture traits have an existence prior to the birth of any living person. They exist outside the human organism . . . the culture of any people at any given time is the product of antecedent cultural forces and consequently is to be explained only in cultural terms.[9]

On the other hand, one of the most prominent American anthropologists, Clyde Kluckhohn of Harvard, calls culture a "logical construct."

> Remember that culture is an abstraction. Hence, culture as a concrete, observable entity does not exist anywhere—unless you wish to say that it exists in the minds of the men who make the abstraction. The objects and events from which we make the abstraction do have an observable existence. But culture is like a map. Just as a map isn't terrain, but an abstract representation of it, so culture is an abstract representation of the trends toward uniformity in the words, acts and artifacts of human groups.[10]
>
> Culture is not something which is seen, but an inferential construct, a logical construct.[11]

Culture, according to this view, is a kind of *ens rationis*. It is a configuration of patterns which the anthropologist abstracts from actual human behavior. It has, as Herskovits of Columbia says, "the reality of any abstraction."[12] Its only reality is in the mind, and culture becomes more and more an *abstractissima notio*.

This, then, is the dichotomy. Either culture possesses substantial existence or enjoys only the tenuous mental existence of a logical construct abstracted from human actions. Here only someone acquainted with the broad possibilities of existence can see a third alternative which resolves the dichotomy.

I believe the solution lies in the phrase "way of life" in our definition of culture.

[9]*Science of Culture* (New York, 1949), p. 78.

[10]"Concept of Culture," *Science of Man in World Crisis* (New York, 1945), p. 93.

[11]*American Journal of Sociology*, LI (1946), 336.

[12]"Process of Culture Change," *Science of Man in World Crisis*, p. 158.

[13]Kossel, "Relations in Philosophy of St. Thomas," THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN (Jan., 1946; Nov., 1946; Jan., 1947; March, 1947).

[14]*De Pot.*, 7, 9; *ST*, I, 77, 3.

[15]*In I Eth.*, lect. 1, nos. 3-4; lect. 9, no. 112; *Impugn. Dei Cult.*, cap. 3.

The two subjects of culture are man and society. We say man is the center of culture, that he produces it and is molded by it. We also say that society is the *locus* of culture insofar as cultural phenomena are produced only by man banded into society.

Now, man produces cultural phenomena because he possesses certain active and passive potencies: intellect, will, appetites, sense and motive powers, each of which is somehow perfected by habit. These powers, although they are in themselves internal perfections of man, are ordained to operation. That is, the powers are virtually relative; they tend to establish relations with other beings outside the self. This virtual relativity or capability of affecting and being affected by external objects is the ground or *esse* of the reality we call relation, although relations are actuated in their full intelligibility and existence only when the virtual relativity of the powers is determined to an actual term.[13]

We see, then, that the human powers which initiate culture are not simply confined within their possessors. Now, since perfection or the end is reached through operation, a thing is in its most perfect state when it is participating in the operational intercommunication with many other things. All things are interrelated because they are not their own ends, nor are they sufficient of themselves to attain their end. Everything is ultimately for the order and harmony of the whole universe. It is in this order that they reach their perfection.[14]

This is most evident in the human world. Every man is radically insufficient. To reach the perfect state man needs fellows in every sphere of life—to provide necessaries, for protection, to share love and ideas, to practice virtue. Man's powers are set for this human interaction. Man is by nature "part of a crowd" and, although unique and individual, paradoxically enough reaches his perfection in and through the crowd. The action-passion relation between men founds that order which we call society.[15]

The human active-passive powers are virtually relative; when in operation they are actually relative, and there is an actual relation between men. Once they have ceased to operate, the relation remains as far as the active powers of the agent are determined to what they have effected in the patient and the effect left in the patient, in the similitude of the agent. Thus the activity of men leaves a permanent "residue," a reality in agent and patient by which they are ordered to each other. This permanent order, as well as the actual operational order, makes society a reality in the category of relation. Society is neither an *ens rationis* nor a substance but an accidental perfection of every participant, by which he virtually and actually participates in an order.

The communication of human goods, then, makes society real. Persons act and are acted upon, give and receive the products of art, produce and

are affected by the virtuous or vicious acts of one another. All this is bound into unity by the direction of actions intentionally to one end, which is, in the right order, the common good.

But the communication of human goods differs vastly in content, manner, and emphasis from one society to another. And this because the tendencies common to human nature are modified by habit. Communication in act will be modeled on an infinite variety of intellectual and appetitive patterns.

This diversity of action and ideal is not haphazard, for every society consecrates a unique pattern and way of life, a pattern woven of many distinctive traits and working itself out into daily life.

This unique pattern exhibited by any culture is the result of a particular adjustment of many factors which compose societal life. It is an order of parts. Now, every human activity demands some order of parts. For example, when we speak of the religious activity of sacrifice in the abstract, we realize that veneration of the deity is an essential aspect, that some offering of goods is to be made, that some official will preside, and so forth. These are all parts of the sacrifice. But the sacrifice as practiced among the Celts will differ from the sacrifice of the Greeks, although the essential parts might be the same. The difference arises not from the parts but from the ordering of the parts.

Anthropologists call sacrifice a "culture trait." This designates the atom of culture, the most fundamental unit of cultural whole which can be conveniently analyzed. By analyzing such a trait for the order of its parts and its reality, we will be able to see the ordered structure of a whole culture composed of many culture traits. Let us take as an example the autumn sacrifice of ancient Greece, which Aristotle describes in Book VIII of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.[16]

Men wish to pay honor to the gods, a tendency based on their realization of their natural dependence on them. Since the primitive religious concept is derived from the phenomena of nature, it is quite logical that honor be paid the gods by offering the work of nature and human toil. Thus, at harvest time, men offer sacrifice as a community. But the occasion of the sacrifice brings other communications into play; the worshippers take advantage of the leisure and company. With the harvest labors completed and a full larder, these autum days are rich for feasting, dancing, and play. All these conditions coincide to make the Greek harvest a season of colorful holiday. This was the birth of a custom—the communication of men in a particular order of activities.

What constitutes the order of this communication? The principal cause of any order of parts is the final cause. This would seem to be primarily

[16]*Nich. Ethics*, VIII, 1160a, 10-30. [17]*In XIII Metaphys.*, lect. 12, no. 2627.

to honor the gods; secondarily, to hold holiday. But this alone does not differentiate the Greek sacrifice from the Celtic or the Roman. The quasi-material cause is the first fruits of harvest, and around this cause cluster many conditions: abundance of food, opportunity for communal activity, relaxation, and so on. The formal cause is the actual order or pattern, the composition of parts.[17] The efficient cause is the participants with particular ideas and habits.

It would appear that the action of a rational efficient cause operating in accord with both the objective end of the work, *finis operis*, as well as many subjective ends, using at will the various material causes provided by the circumstances, establishes the form of sacrifice. The custom, in its basic nature, evolves from the finality within the efficient cause, using and correlating at will the available conditions. Man, then, makes the order of parts according to his analysis of the situation.

But how is this culture trait a reality? Each participant performs many singular actions. The objects of these actions are the deity to be honored, other persons, and material objects. The activities are real accidental operations of the agent and their results are passions or accidents of the objects considered as patients. The unity in the activities results from the exemplar as final cause directing the operations of intellect and will and, in subordination to these, the lower appetitive and motive powers. Thus all the singular actions are ordered to the whole activity we call the sacrifice.

Now, we say that things are in order when there is some relationship between them. A relationship, however, is not some kind of Siamese bond physically joining the objects. Rather, the relation's reality lies in some foundation in each individual object in the order. True, the intelligibility of relation demands that we conceive of a kind of transition or *ad aliud* between objects. But the actuality of the relation is grounded in some inherent feature which is somehow open to other things. Such openness is a property of quantity as a potential standard of measure and of the active and passive powers. Openness is virtual relativity. When quantity is actually serving as measure or the active power is determined to a particular patient, the relativity is actual. It consists in an order of this agent to this patient. The order, therefore, is a real accidental perfection of the agent and patient order, is in itself inherent to each participant within the series and implies in its ratio a transition to other objects. Order as a reality resides in each of the ordered objects. The operations of these objects, springing from the principles perfected by the order, are ordered operations.

The culture trait, then, has reality in those who practice it. It is not simply the plan of activity existing in the minds of the participants but a relation of order based on habits and practical ideas as active powers.

Now, anthropologists identify a culture not only by single distinctive traits but by an apparent unity between many traits. We say, for example, that Navajo religious ideas, Navajo marriage customs, Navajo social structure, and Navajo eating habits coalesce into some pattern or order. Do these constitute any reality which can justly be named a culture? Or are they disparate traits which are accidentally one because they are practiced by people who dwell together?

Culture traits are not nomads. They are human activities; the motive and functions of one trait overflow into many others. But an order and unity of many disparate activities can come only through intellect.[18] And, since these many activities are the manifold expression of human life, the unity will derive from the ideas of human life which those who live it have developed. At this point, we find intellect serving as the highest co-ordinator of cultural activities. Habit and custom which grow out of an intellectual analysis of particular situations provide unity in culture traits. But all the culture traits are unified by an intellectual analysis of life as a whole. Every activity of man will be modified by the way in which he understands his nature and finality. Thus Father Eschman calls the Second Question of the *Prima Secundae*, in which St. Thomas acutely analyzes the various conceptions of human finality, a rapid and profound philosophy of civilization.[19]

The order and unity of human activity derives from the *finis operantis*. The conception of the end will guide the choice of means and the co-ordination between them. This ideal of human life is the value, the ethos, the spirit, which is the principle of order in the pattern of human life which we call a culture.

The reality of culture, therefore, consists, as does that of the trait, in the relation of order established in human communication. It is a perfection of those who participate in this order, and its real existence is grounded in the relativity of the active principles of human action: intellectual conception of the end of man as the rule of the practical order and in the active habits and customs as principles of human communication.

But if culture is a relation, how does it differ from the relation we call society? Society, too, is a relation caused by human communication. It seems to me that the difference between the reality of culture and society is conceptual. Both society and culture, metaphysically considered, are the same factual reality inherent in the participants. But considered simply as the order of communication it is called society; considered in regard to the formal content of this communication springing from distinctive habits, it is called culture.

[18] *ST*, I, q. 14, a. 8; q. 22, a. 1.
[19] Eschmann, *Stoic and Christian Sources of Mediaeval Social Doctrine* (unpublished lecture notes).

Anthropologists and sociologists look more to the *ratio* of culture and society than to their actual existence. As such, they can define society as the group which communicates, culture as the *way in which* they communicate. Understood in this way, they say that society is the "carrier of a culture," that culture determines the society as form determines matter, and that society is the potency which limits the culture spatially and temporally.

We may now define culture in metaphysical terms as the order of communication of human goods as determined by habits formed in a particular historical time and place.

Order of communication indicates the reality of culture and its social aspect. Human goods include everything flowing from, and demanded by, human nature and natural tendency—goods of body and soul. These found the universality of culture. Habits are the principles of cultural variation, are developed under intellect and will, and are influenced by the contingent circumstance in which they are formed.

We believe this definition has rich implications. It is a refutation both of cultural relativism and cultural determinism. It could serve as focal point for fruitful anthropological theory and as a basis for constructive criticism of modern and primitive cultures. It should reveal both the intimate union of cultural essentials and accidentals as well as their radical relativity. On it could be built, we believe, a cultural philosophy which complements the magnificent social philosophy of Aristotle and Aquinas.

Marquette Workshop in the Teaching of Philosophy

EDWARD D. SIMMONS, *Marquette University.*

The Department of Philosophy of Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, conducted its second biennial "Philosophical Workshop in the Teaching of Philosophy" during the four-day period from June 10 through June 13. The general purpose of the workshop was the improvement of the teaching of philosophy through the discussion of those philosophical ideas which determine and order what is to be taught. The particular

area of discussion for this year's workshop was that of the philosophy of man. Forty-four teachers of philosophy, theology, and psychology participated in the workshop, representing twenty-four different schools from eleven states and two Canadian provinces.

On successive days the discussion was ordered to the solution of these four problems: Is philosophical knowledge of man attained without humanistic (that is, literary and historical) knowledge of man? Is the philosophical knowledge of man attained without experimental psychology? Is the philosophical knowledge of man *one* science? Is the philosophical knowledge of man attained without theological knowledge?

Each day was begun with the presentation of a formal paper attempting an answer to the question for the day. Father Gerald B Phelan, St. Michael's College, Toronto, presented the first day's paper on the relation between the humanistic approach to man and the philosophy of man. Dr. Donald A. Gallagher, Marquette University, spoke on the relation between experimental psychology and the philosophy of man. Father Joseph Owens, C.SS.R., Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies of Toronto University, discussed the unity of the philosophy of man. Father Bernard J. Cooke, S. J., Department of Theology, Marquette University, gave the final paper relating philosophical knowledge of man with theology.

The major portion of each day was devoted to discussion of the day's problem, especially in the light of the papers presented, with small group discussions in the morning preparing the way for a general discussion period in the afternoon. Special events in the evenings included an informal discussion led by Dr. Raymond J. McCall, Director of the Department of Psychology, Marquette University, on the contribution of scientific method to the philosophical understanding of man.

Members of the Department of Philosophy of Marquette serving on the workshop staff included Father Gerard Smith, S.J., director of the department; Father Francis C. Wade, S.J., program chairman; Dr. Edward D. Simmons, executive chairman; Drs. Charles O'Neil and James Anderson, discussion chairmen; Drs. Griesbach and Robb, summarizers of the general discussion; and Father William Dooley, S.J., who prepared a book exhibit displaying recent paperback editions of philosophical import.

The workshop was represented as a special event in the program of the Marquette University 1957 summer session.

The Centre De Wulf-Mansion of the Institut Supérieur de Philosophie of the University of Louvain will sponsor an International Congress of Medieval Philosophy at Louvain and Brussels, August 28 to September 4, 1958. The date is chosen to fit in with the International Exposition at Brussels in 1958 and with the XIIth International Congress of Philosophy (September 12 to 18, 1958, Venice-Padua). The theme of the congress will be "Man and His Destiny according to the Thinkers of the Middle Ages." Communications are to be addressed to the Centre (2, place Cardinal Mercier, Louvain).

Sister M. Ann Ida, b. v. m., chairman of the Mundelein College Philosophy Department, was named president of the college on August 15, 1957. She has served on the Executive Council of the American Catholic Philosophical Association.

The Association for Realistic Philosophy will hold its fall meeting at the University of Connecticut on October 25 and 26. On Friday evening, Miss Guillemine DeVitry will read a paper entitled "A Comparison of the Existentialisms of Sartre and Marcel"; Mr. William Sadler will be the commentator. On Saturday, Mr. David Freeman will read a paper, "The Role of Reason in the Thought of Tillich and St. Thomas" (the commentator has not been announced), and Mr. J. Arthur Martin will read a paper, "The Abandonment of Natural Theology"; the commentator will be Mr. Theodore Young.

At the Easter Meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association in Chicago, the Reverend Allan B. Wolter, o. f. m. (St. Bonaventure University), vice-president during the past year, became president, and Professor Lawrence J. Lynch (St. Michael's College, Toronto) was elected vice-president. Next year's meeting is to be held in Detroit, and the theme will be Scholasticism.

The papers at this year's meeting will be discussed when the annual volume of Proceedings has been published.

Sense Lines: A Technique for Teaching the Text of St. Thomas

ANDREW H. BACHHUBER, S.J., *Saint Louis University.*

During the past few years I have used sense-lines as an aid in introducing students to the text of St. Thomas. The best way to explain their nature and purpose and to show why they are an effective technique is to give an example. Below is a sentence of St. Thomas's *De Ente et Essentia* that is very difficult for beginners when presented in the usual block text but very easy when presented in sense-lines.

A Sample

Et quia, ut dictum est,
natura speciei est indeterminata respectu individui,
sicut natura generis respectu speciei,
inde est
quod, sicut id quod est genus
prout praedicatur de specie,
implicat in sua significatione,
quamvis indistincte,
totum quod determinate est in specie,
ita etiam id quod est species,
secundum quod praedicatur de individuo
oportet quod significet
totum id quod essentialiter est in individuo,
licet indistincte,
et hoc modo essentia Socratis significatur nomine hominis:
unde homo de Socrate praedicatur.[1]

Inde (4) refers back to *quia* (1) and is therefore directly under it. Similarly, *ita* (10) is paired up with *sicut* (5) and is therefore directly under it. Because of parallelisms and contrasts, the following pairs of lines have like indentation: 6 and 11, 7 and 12, 8 and 14, and 9 and 13. By the use of two devices—(*a*) by placing each word group on a separate line and (*b*) by varying the indentation—the structure of the sentence is displayed to the eye. Thus, the beginner is enabled to see at a glance how the sentence fits together, and even the advanced student who wishes to make an intensive study of a text is enabled to see many details that would otherwise escape his notice.

[1]St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Ente et Essentia:* arranged in sense-lines and supplied with paragraph headings by Andrew H. Bachhuber, S.J. (Saint Louis: The Modern Schoolman, 1957. Pp. iv + 31. Mimeographed, single copies, $1.00; five or more copies, $.80 each), pp. 10-11.

JAMES COLLINS, *Saint Louis University.*

Existence et liberté. **By Joseph de Finance, S.J. Paris: Vitte, 1955. Pp. 389.**

Die Religion: Eine philosophische Untersuchung auf geschichtlicher Grundlage. **By August Brunner, S.J. Freiburg i. Br.: Herder, 1956. Pp. 390.**

Father de Finance, who wrote a memorable dissertation on being and acting in St. Thomas, presents here his own reflections on free action and its relation to existence. His work is broad in scope, since it moves from human freedom to the archetypal freedom of God and from here to the problems of creation, evil, and beatitude. In viewing these questions from the perspective of freedom, he wants to take account of the great emphasis upon freedom in modern philosophy, without going to the extreme of absolutizing it. Balance can be achieved by giving a metaphysical interpretation of freedom; that is, by making constant reference of a given kind of self-determination to its appropriate act of existing. An analogical treatment then becomes possible, so that human self-determination in action is never divorced from a reference to divine freedom.

What saves this book from being just another routine discussion is precisely its awareness of the modern issues. Like most French authors today, de Finance uses a dialectical method for describing the problem. He traces the difficulties over freedom to a twofold "mortification and devaluation," one bearing on the human subject and the other upon the objective world. The devaluation of the self by Marxism and determinism is due to a fear lest man be released from responsibility toward the material world. Conversely, the devaluation of material things by idealism and existentialism stems from a resolve not to submerge man in the sea of objects. Both extremes can be overcome by means of the primary affirmation of man as a personal existent, yet one who is present to the world of other existents. The act of existing on the part of material things safeguards their being as subjects in some sense which is not wholly alien to human subjectivity. Human freedom is distinctive among the modes of finite action, but it must be exercised in the material world as well as in respect to our spiritual aims.

Along the route, this book illuminates a number of basic problems. De Finance rejects the rationalist meaning for God as *causa sui*, and yet he

argues that this name is an obscure way of affirming the existential act of divine being. It could also be regarded as affirming the primacy of essence, considered as self-moving power. The question is frankly faced whether the doctrine on the glory of God as the end of creative action does not lead to an egoistic view of God. The author is not content with the formal definition of glory but analyzes its human significance into three factors: a negation of any dependence of God on finite things, a proposal of the ultimate end for human action, and a specification of our reaching that end by sharing in the personal life of God. The end of man is discussed here in terms of freedom as liberation. Lest liberation be regarded as a flight from the world, it is presented as a many-leveled effort, which includes the social and artistic transformation of the world as well as a moral and religious act. De Finance's treatise is eminently balanced; it is a model in its kind for combining Thomistic doctrines on existence and freedom with the special concerns of the contemporary humanistic mind.

Father Brunner states bluntly in his foreword that he is writing a philosophy of religion and not a natural theology, and that its basis is laid more in the historical and phenomenological studies on religion than in the metaphysical demonstrations concerning God. He does include an introductory chapter of philosophical doctrine on human cognition, the composite nature of man, and causality in the physical world. It serves the purpose of avoiding the two extremes of an idealistic and a positivistic conception of religion. The former is criticized not only for failing to take account of our composite way of being and knowing, but also because of its inadequate appreciation of the religious elements of rite and symbolism. Positivism is right in distinguishing between mechanistic sequence and an animistic view of natural happenings; but this does not make man's free and personal causality an illusion or the inference to a personal God a fallacy.

The nature of religion is not laid down abstractly at the outset, and no attempt is made to reduce all religions to a minimal skeleton. On inductive grounds, Brunner comes to describe religion as man's effort to adapt himself to reality in its fullest and most complete significance, where the absolute is decisive. It is a response of man in his whole being and arises when the individual in his cultural setting becomes aware of his own spiritual and personal nature as well as of his dependence upon a superior, personal source of salvation. Concerning the type of knowledge involved in the natural religious recognition of God, the author is not altogether clear. He is sure that the practical conviction in God is not based upon expressly philosophical proofs; but on the positive side he calls it, somewhat vaguely, the fruit of a spontaneous insight or intuition.

The latter term is qualified at once, since the religious apprehension of God need not be an extraordinary act and certainly is not a direct sight of the divine being. The facts of comparative religion are combed to show the symbolic character of most religious thinking and the co-operation of sensuous, psychic, and spiritual factors. Effective use is made of Dawson's thesis about the interrelation between religion and culture in explaining the variations among religions.

It may be significant that Brunner, who has been dealing with Jungians for many years (see his articles in *Stimmen der Zeit*), is much less favorably disposed toward Jung's theory of religion than is Father Victor White. He regards this theory as a psychologizing of religion, in the literal sense of reducing it to a product of the psychic aspect of man. From Brunner's standpoint, religion does involve a psychic factor but is fundamentally a relation of man, in his free spiritual nature, to God. On the further issue of how to relate an inductive philosophy of religion to a philosophy of God, this book is disappointing. It treats the philosophy of God chiefly as a negative norm but does not indicate any positive basis of integration between the philosophical and the natural religious knowledge of God. Pascal's dichotomy is not overcome from the philosophical side, although in a theological "afterword" the author does show the possibility of uniting natural religion with the Christian revelation. The question of the nature and method of a theistic philosophy of religion still requires independent investigation.

JAMES COLLINS, *Saint Louis University.*

Contemporary European Philosophy. **By I. M. Bocheński, O.P. Trans. D. Nicholl and K. Aschenbrenner. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1956. Pp. xviii + 326. $5.00.**

Contemporary Philosophy. **By Frederick Copleston, S.J. Westminster: Newman Press, 1956. Pp. ix + 230. $4.00.**

There is extraordinary difficulty about writing a textbook in contemporary philosophy, and such books are relatively scarce. For one thing, the field is constantly shifting, so that men and problems which are temporarily to the fore often slip into obscurity before the book is fairly launched. Hence it is more advisable to provide some general frame of reference than to attempt to cover every individual writer in the contemporary field. Father Bocheński's pedagogical skill is apparent in the arrangement of his materials. Perhaps more important than the individual chapters are the seven parts into which the book is divided: the origin of contemporary

philosophy, materialism, idealism, vitalism, essentialism, existentialism, and the philosophy of being. Although these headings are overlapping on some points, they do serve as a helpful guide for studying present currents of thought.

The fact that emphasis is laid upon European philosophy both enhances the book in some ways and also presents some drawbacks for the American student. It calls forcefully to our attention such schools as Italian idealism and Neo-Kantianism, and such men as Lavelle and Hartmann, even though they lie beyond the interest of most American philosophers today. The ordering of the seven parts of the book also suggests the main trend of Bocheński's argument; namely, that we should not become so fascinated with analytic and positivist schools as to neglect the other trends which point in the direction of a more metaphysical interpretation of man and his world. Within twenty-five pages, for instance, an intelligible sketch is made of some features in the phenomenologies of Husserl and Scheler, thus adding significantly to the sparse amount of guidance in English on these thinkers. In the appendix, written for the second German edition, there is a succinct description of mathematical logic and international organizations in philosophy. The fifty-five-page bibliography is carefully selected and organized, providing the advanced reader with the necessary leads for further study in the sources and secondary works in various European languages.

At the same time, this textbook will not prepare the student sufficiently for the situation of philosophy in contemporary America and Britain. Although there is a generous chapter on Russell, the whole movement of analytic philosophy is squeezed into a pendant section to the chapter on "neopositivism" or logical empiricism. There is no separate treatment of naturalism, although one chapter deals with James, Schiller, Bergson, and Dewey, thus providing a useful background for such a study. None of the idealists treated here (Croce, Brunschvicg, and the Neo-Kantians) presents as much of a challenge in America as the writings of Blanshard and Harris.

On some of these scores, Father Copleston's book is a neat complement to the Bocheński volume. It is not the eagerly awaited final volume of his *History of Philosophy*, but its scope is indicated by the subtitle, "Studies of Logical Positivism and Existentialism." It consists of twelve separate papers, written on various occasions, but dealing in common with logical empiricism, analytic philosophy, and existentialism. The first seven essays make a survey of the present interests in British philosophy, with the emphasis falling inevitably upon the problem of verifiability and the technique of analysis. Copleston's approach is not that of historical exposition, but rather that of a direct treatment of the problems

at hand. His essays supply some authentic readings *in* analytic philosophy as well as about it.

How far a metaphysical mind can move by analytic routes has not yet been determined. But the example of these essays suggests that the progress will be circumambulatory, rather than penetrative. This is indicated by the position taken on four issues. In arguing that there is an implicit metaphysics even in a linguistic study of scientific statements, Copleston does not press home the further point that there are different conceptions of metaphysics. In the delicate work of dealing linguistically with the analytic philosophers, it is not effective to insist upon a definite position concerning being. Secondly, the demands of logical empiricism that one should furnish some factual basis are admitted as valid, but the demands are then formulated in terms of the Kantian problem of metaphysics. This procedure indicates that one cannot hope to resolve the issue solely in the terms presented by contemporary analysis but must be willing to make a study of the origins in Hume and Kant, and to base some criticism at this level. In the third place, Copleston proposes to justify metaphysics through reflection upon the following description of the starting point—"the self as existing in an undefined and unarticulated situation." This point of departure is not readily admitted by the analytic thinkers and is sufficiently indeterminate to permit Spinoza, Sartre, and Marcel to take very diverse metaphysical positions. Finally, the essay on the divine names provides a good instance of the difficulty of developing a realistic metaphysics within the analytic context. Copleston notes that the meaning of the terms predicated of God cannot be well and fully treated apart from the question of God's existence. Yet an abstraction from the latter is required in most analytic inquiries into the nature of God, so that it may be illusory to claim that a common discussion is transpiring with those who recognize the crucial importance of retaining the affirmation of the truth about the act of existing which is proper to God.

The third point mentioned above is indicative of Copleston's sympathy with the personalist and existentialist philosophies, at least in their theistic form. He gives a vigorous account of the existentialist movement, with emphasis upon its humanistic foundation and its orientation toward the problem of God. Just as he is willing to learn from the empiricist and analytic philosophers, so he is ready to supplement their study of sense data with the existentialist concern for human freedom and problems of interpersonal communication. In both parts of the book, one can profitably follow Copleston's examination of the conditions under which philosophical inquiry normally functions today. His essays provide excellent materials for class discussion.

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The Image: Knowledge in Life and Society. **By Kenneth Boulding. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1956. Pp. iii + 175. $3.75.**

An Essay on the Foundations of Our Knowledge. **By Antoine Augustin Cournot. Trans. Merritt H. Moore. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1956. Pp. lxx + 615. $9.00.**

Both of the above books are essays in the theory of knowledge. Both authors have also made significant contributions to economics. In both works, the scientific background of the authors has had a marked influence on their philosophical speculations. Here the parallel ends. Boulding wishes "to be suggestive rather than exhaustive and to open up some new vistas rather than to complete a picture." Cournot, on the other hand, offers a comprehensive treatise on knowledge, systematically taking up every important issue from the critical problem to the division of the sciences.

Kenneth Boulding is a contemporary American economist. *The Image* is a kind of brainstorm which he ascribes to an eleven-month stay at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford (and, more remotely, to his seminar on the integration of the social sciences at the University of Michigan). The germ of his thought appears in a paper which he delivered at the American Economic Association convention in 1951. In any case, the unusual spontaneity of this essay is evidenced by the fact that it was dictated in uninterrupted composition.

The "image" is subjective knowledge—knowledge considered as possessed-by-a-knower—insofar as it is the principle of organization for any new data fed to the knower. Subjective knowledge is conceived as a kind of feedback—similar to the thermostat in a heating system. The thermostat interprets incoming messages within a particular frame of reference and, in terms of its conception of the world, settles on an appropriate response. Similarly, argues Boulding, the image of each knower enables him to organize and to interpret the constant inflow of messages. The author takes as his central question, What determines the image? In other words, what subjective and objective factors shape the image?

Boulding pursues the answer to this question in the second, third, and fourth chapters of his essay. First, he discusses the image as it appears on various subhuman levels of reality. Then, in Chapter Four, he treats the images on the human level, sketching its complexity by means of ten "dimensions": (1) spatial, (2) temporal, (3) relational, (4) personal, (5) valuational, (6) affectional, (7) conscious, unconscious, and sub-conscious, (8) certainty and uncertainty, clarity and vagueness, (9) reality or

unreality, (10) public and private. The author expands his reflections on these points in the five subsequent chapters, wherein he tries to show the usefulness of the image-concept for sociology, economics, political philosophy, history, and for the discussion of "subcultures and the subuniverses of discourse."

The author's bombshell is launched in the next-to-last chapter. He proposes a theory of knowledge based on the image-concept—eiconics. Since the image is abstract and constructural, it can only serve as the foundation for a science; hence a scientific theory of knowledge based on the "remarkable unifying power" of the image. The rest of this chapter reviews instances where the image is employed by contemporary scientists, and the following chapter offers a stimulating discussion of "the image and truth."

Boulding's witty and provocative essay deserves the attention of philosophers of knowledge. They will not wholly agree with him, but they will catch a fresh perspective from his reflections. Catholic readers will dislike some inaccurate accounts of their beliefs, but these infrequent errors do not mar the generally high quality of this essay.

Antoine Augustin Cournot (1801-1877) was an accomplished French mathematician, economist, and philosopher. His *Essay*, published in 1851, was his first major excursion into philosophy, undertaken after more than twenty years of intense and fruitful speculation in mathematics. The present volume is the first English translation of the *Essay*, and the translator has equipped it with a helpful survey of Cournot's thought.

Cournot's over-all purpose is "to depict the pre-eminent role of reason in the elaboration of human knowledge." He achieves this by developing the ideas of "the reason of things," order and chance, and their consequences with respect to probability and probable judgments, applying these notions in a critical examination of the sources of human knowledge. Cournot conceives philosophical speculation in terms of rationalism-versus-empiricism. While his own thought avoids both extremes, it is clearly penetrated by the common biases of modern philosophy.

The author divides his treatise into twenty-five chapters with four major divisions. First, there are five introductory chapters wherein he develops his basic principles of criticism. These are followed by seven chapters which are his critical analysis of how and what we know. The next eleven chapters criticize the form and expression of our knowledge, and culminate in a schema for the division of human learning. The next-to-last chapter examines other philosophical systems "as they are related to the principles presented in this work." The final chapter is a summary.

Cournot's criticism is rooted in three insights: his conception of order and the "reason of things," the notion of philosophical probability, and

the concepts of continuity and discontinuity. Order is the object of reason and of philosophy. For reason is "the faculty which lays hold of the order according to which facts, laws, relations, and objects of our knowledge are connected with and proceed from one another." Formal reality—which we know best—is accessible to reason insofar as it is structured. Hence, structure in extramental reality is correctly called the "reason of things."

Philosophical probability is to be employed wherever logical demonstrations are impossible. This consists of judgments based on analogy—moving from one set of resemblances to others—or on induction—that is, what is now called scientific induction. Cournot develops his notion of philosophical probability after a long discussion of the disruptive influence of chance on orderly series of causes. Finally, he places heavy emphasis on the distinction between continuity and discontinuity in the objects of thought. We *think* of (formal) reality as discontinuous, but the general law of nature is continuity. Hence the approximative nature of knowledge.

The professional reader will find Cournot's *Essay* a stimulating variation in modern philosophy. The author's patient search for sound positions, coupled with the caution and reserve of his generalizations, evidences his devotion to scholarship. Nonetheless, the *Essay* has serious shortcomings. Cournot, like his contemporaries, has but scant acquaintance with philosophical speculation prior to Descartes. Many readers will doubt that his understanding of Aristotle is as impressive as the translator claims. Because of this blind spot, Cournot's philosophy takes scientific knowledge for its chief point of reference. "The system of critical philosophy here indicated is none other than the system of criticism followed in the sciences and in the conduct of life." Scientific knowledge is viewed as the "organic perfecting" of knowledge and is preferred as data to "common" knowledge or knowledge in its rudimentary state. Hence, scientific induction is proposed as a philosopher's tool, and it becomes virtually impossible to distinguish philosophical speculation from scientific theories. Finally, Cournot's extraordinary mathematical background has given a distinct bias to his critical philosophy. Notions such as probability and continuity are openly carried over, with modifications, from his mathematical speculations. Similarly, his division of human learning is proudly displayed as a table of double entry. All defects aside, however, the *Essay* is worth reading as an interesting hybrid born of science and modern philosophy.

UENTIN LAUER, S.J., *Fordham University.*

oyce's Metaphysics. **By Gabriel Marcel. Trans. Virginia and Gordon Ringer. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1956. Pp. xix + 180. $4.50.**

To a reawakened interest in the philosophy of Josiah Royce the transla-ion of Gabriel Marcel's penetrating study, first published in 1918, brings ew possibilities of understanding a thought which is "extremely complex nd subtle" (p. 76). It would be far too optimistic to say that this little ook unravels all the riddles which Royce offers—especially as Marcel is ometimes more mystifying than Royce himself—but it can be of great elp in interpreting to an American audience a thought which is shot rough with Hegelian overtones. Thus, it may come as something of a urprise to hear an American philosophy refer to itself as "concrete dealism"; but it becomes more intelligible when set over against the ntinomies of realism, critical idealism, and irrationalism.

Royce is as much the enemy of subjectivism as is any realist. He is nvinced, however, that subjectivism can ultimately be avoided only by n appeal to a higher subject, of which all other subjects are but the expressions." Thus, the epistemological, the metaphysical, the ethical, nd the religious become inextricably bound up in a thought for which etaphysical "interpretation" is precisely an appreciation of values—as pposed to description, which is characteristic of scientific thought. To o beyond science and "to assert a truth as more than possible is to ssert the concrete reality of an experience which knows this truth" (p. 30). his is Royce's way of affirming the existence of the absolute as an indi-idual; and it is also his way of describing the ultimate source of all alue and, hence, of all reality. "Absolute reality" can be described only s the "complete experience of omniscient mind" (p. 31), and whatever hare human minds may have in value and truth is by virtue of their ontinuity with this "omniscient individual" (p. 32). Human experience, hen, is but a "fragment . . . a partial expression of the absolute experi-nce" (p. 35).

That Hegel would recognize himself in this sort of thought need hardly e stressed, but one has the uncomfortable feeling that this is Hegel with sentimental twist. As it matures, Royce's philosophy becomes more and nore a philosophy of community, expressing itself in a sort of mystic oyalty, which Royce sees as the genuine expression of Christian love. It s this love which Royce sees as the "principle of individuation," whereby nen are distinguished from each other and from God. Thus, the con-ition for being an individual is being in the community, where love and oyalty are possible. Unfortunately, this loyalty seems to get its value

from the fact that it is loyalty and not from its object; and thus it can hardly be said to escape wholly from the subjectivism which Royce recries. It should be remarked, however, that the presence of the "Absolute Subject," above and beyond all merely individual considerations, insures for Royce that individual subjectivity is *given* an objectivity, ideal, of course, but still concrete.

Ultimately Royce's "metaphysics" can be understood only in terms of its ethical preoccupations. Being is defined as "a living participation in a concrete order" (p. 112), but this participation is "living" precisely because it involves the moral value of love and loyalty. Because "religious preoccupations were always in the foreground of his mind" (p. 131), Royce could refuse to be systematic. By the same token, he could bequeath to us a philosophy interesting for its particular insights rather than for its over-all consistency.

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